


JPRS-TAC-87-061

14 DECEMBER 1987



JPRS Report

Arms Control

14 DECEMBER 1987

ARMS CONTROL

CONTENTS

SDI, SPACE ARMS

- USSR: Sagdeyev Interviewed on ABM Treaty
(Moscow TASS, 3 Oct 87) 1

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR, SPACE ARMS TALKS

- Soviet Commentator on SDI, Reagan Stance
(Moscow Domestic Service, 15 Oct 87) 2
- USSR: Bogdanov on Arms Accord, Summit, SLI
(Radomir Bogdanov Interview; Paris LIBERATION, 1 Oct 87) 3

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

- USSR: Impact of Missile Cuts on Security Argued
(Moscow IZVESTIYA, 3 Oct 87; Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA,
9 Oct 87) 4
- Bogdanov, UK Academic Debate, by A. Ostalskiy, et al. 4
Security Will Increase, by M. Ponomarev 10
- Soviet Commentator Warns Against Overoptimism
(Yuriy Bandura; Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI, No 42,
18 Oct 87) 13
- USSR: Shultz Meetings, Talks in Moscow
(Various sources, various dates) 15

Shultz Arrives	15
Carlucci Arrival Noted	15
Discussions Begin	16
Chernyshev Comments	16
Marks 'Eve of Major Step', by N. Vasilyev	18
Pyadyshev Interviewed	22
Shultz, Shevardnadze Talks	23
Redman, Gerasimov Briefing	24
Preview of Shultz-Gorbachev	26
Gorbachev, Shultz Meeting	27
Gorbachev Trip 'Possible'	27
Further Shultz, Shevardnadze Talks	28
Discussions With Gorbachev	29
Conclusion of Talks	33
SDI Seen as 'Obstacle'	34
Reagan Stands by SDI	35
Shultz News Conference	36
Shevardnadze Conference, by Eduard Shevardnadze	38
Reagan on Shultz Talks	42
Shultz, Carlucci Depart	43
Shultz Reports to NATO	43
Meets With Journalists	44
Moscow Talks Discussed	45
INF Treaty 'Within Reach'	45
U.S. 'Disappointment' Noted, by V. Gan	46
 Austria: Mock, Jankowitsch Welcome INF Agreement (Vienna WIENER ZEITUNG, 23 Sep 87)	 48
 Italy's Andreotti Reports To Foreign Affairs Committee (Rome ANSA, 30 Sep 87)	 49
 Italian PC's Napolitano on European Defense (Rome L'ESPRESSO, 4 Oct 87)	 50
 PRC: People's Daily on INF Agreement (Cao Ye, Li Daozhong; Beijing RENMIN RIBAO, 23 Sep 87)	 52
 XINHUA: UN Reaction to INF Accord (Beijing XINHUA, 25 Sep 87)	 54
 Wu Xueqian Comments	54
'Round-up' on U.S., USSR Positions	55
 PRC Premier 'Welcomes' INF Accord (XINHUA Domestic Service, 28 Sep 87)	 57
 Briefs	
Belgium's Martens on Missile Deployment, Treaty	58
Dutch Prime Minister on Cruise Missile Deployment	58

CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

USSR: U.S. Decides To Allow CW Dump Inspection (Moscow TASS International Service, 4 Nov 87)	59
---	----

NUCLEAR TESTING/FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

Soviet Journal Views Treaty of Tlatelolco on 20th Anniversary (V. L. Orlov; Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA, No 5, May 87)	60
Soviet Commentator on North Europe Nuclear-Free Zone (Moscow Domestic Service, 14 Oct 87)	64

RELATED ISSUES

Gorbachev Article on 'Secure World' (M. S. Gorbachev; Moscow PRAVDA, 17 Sep 87)	66
Gorbachev's Award Ceremony Speech in Murmansk (Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev; Moscow Television Service, 1 Oct 87)	72
Soviet Academics Discuss 'Reasonable Sufficiency' (Vitaliy Zhurkin, et al.; Moscow NEW TIMES, No 40, 12 Oct 87)	77
Soviet Roundtable Discusses South Atlantic Peace Zone (Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA, No 5, May 87)	81
Italy Accepts WEU Stance on Security (Paris AFP, 27 Oct 87; Rome ANSA, 27, 28 Oct 87)	84
Continued Alliance With U.S.	34
Andreotti, Zanone Speak to Press	85
Andreotti View Supported	86

/9986

USSR: SAGDEYEV INTERVIEWED ON ABM TREATY

52001002 Moscow TASS in English 2157 GMT 3 Oct 87

[Text] Moscow October 3 TASS—"The Soviet-U.S. treaty on the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems is an exceptionally important treaty the significance of which is difficult to overestimate", stated Academician Roald Sagdeyev, director of the Space Research Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

In an interview with Soviet television on the occasion of the 15th anniversary of the treaty's entering into force, he pointed out the strategic parity equation includes nuclear retaliation forces which are called upon to keep the sides from suddenly attacking each other.

"If some forces, even the so-called defence forces, are introduced to the equation, the entire state of strategic balance changes qualitatively. This may lead to a totally unrestrained increase in offensive forces, too. It was precisely the awareness of this fact that led to the signing of a treaty to this effect by the United States and the Soviet Union 15 years ago. The existence and observance of the treaty has influenced further arms control and arms reduction processes".

In answer to the question to what extent the ABM treaty applies to the establishment of a space-based anti-missile

defence system and whether scientists and engineers thought about the possibility of developing such a system 15 years ago, Roald Sagdeyev pointed out that, on the one hand, scientists and engineers supposed that sooner or later such types of technology as laser ones, and further advances in space technology, could in principle bring about technical possibilities for the development of powerful orbital weapons. Therefore the concept of limiting strategic defence research had always been taking this possibility into account.

"On the other hand, considering the strategic balance equation, it does not matter where defence is maintained from the earth or outer space. If the two sides agree to limit defence, this should apply to outer space as well".

"Attempts at the so-called broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty, the attempts which boil down to assertion that it is ostensibly possible to test new technologies in outer space, undoubtedly run counter to the letter and spirit of the ABM Treaty", emphasized the director of the Space Research Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

/9274

SOVIET COMMENTATOR ON SDI, REAGAN STANCE

LD151450 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1030 GMT 15 Oct 87

[Text] In an interview to CNN Television, U.S. President Reagan expressed the view that the Soviet Union has supposedly changed its position regarding the non-militarization of space and that it is now ready for an accord on a 50% reduction of strategic arms, even under conditions of the United States abandoning the ABM Treaty. At the same time, Reagan quite clearly stated his refusal to give up even partially his Star Wars program for the sake of progress at the talks on strategic arms. We have asked Vladimir Bogachev, TASS commentator on military issues, to comment on this statement by the U.S. President:

[Bogachev] In his interview the President often presented desirability as reality, in particular the part concerning the Strategic Defense Initiative—this is what the Star Wars program is called in Washington. I want to say that our country's principled position toward this program—the Soviet demands for linking the reduction of strategic arms with the pledge by the two sides not to extend the strike arms race to space—remain unchangeable. We believe that it is senseless to liquidate strategic arms on the relatively small area of the earth's surface if at the same time the green light is given to the deployment of strike weapons systems in infinite space. The deployment of unpredictable and thus extremely dangerous arms in space around the earth will, besides other things, sharply increase the risk of a disastrous nuclear war. This can happen as a result of an incorrect assessment of the other side's intentions, a computer malfunction, of warning and communication systems; or simply a malfunction of systems.

I want to draw attention to the fact that the position of the Soviet Union on the reduction of strategic arms is not rigid. Our delegation in Geneva is constantly engaged in a search for solutions which would take into account the interests of the two sides. The Soviet Union has proposed at the talks to reach an agreement on a 50% reduction of strategic arms on the basis of mutual pledges, and not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for a period of 10 years. The Soviet Union has proposed agreement on a list of systems, whose launching into space would either be prohibited or allowed.

A number of new proposals have also been submitted by Soviet diplomats regarding research work. However, Washington, as it has been noted, does not wish to give up even a part of its program on the militarization of space for the sake of progress on the path of reducing nuclear long-range missiles. It has to be noted that if it was not for the fanatical support of the present administration for the Star Wars program, the question of a 50% reduction in arms systems would have been solved a long time ago, in the interests of all mankind.

The numerical levels of reduction have been agreed on, the sublevels of composite elements of strategic triades have been defined. The Soviet Union, moving halfway toward the wishes of the U.S. side, has agreed to reduce by half its heavy intercontinental missiles. One can only hope that common sense will eventually take the upper hand in Washington. The peoples of our planet need star peace, not Star Wars.

/8309

CSO: 52001005

USSR: BOGDANOV ON ARMS ACCORD, SUMMIT, SDI

52001001 Paris LIBERATION in French 1 Oct 87 p 24

[Interview with Radomir Bogdanov, deputy director of the USSR Academy of Sciences United States of America and Canada Institute, by Alexandre Adler—date and place not given]

[Text] *Liberation*: The agreement reached between the United States and the Soviet Union on 18 September is going to lead to a third Reagan-Gorbachev summit and to the first U.S.-Soviet treaty since SALT II (which has never been ratified). Yet the Soviet Union spoke only of an "agreement in principle." Can this be seen as a sign of some reservations?

Bogdanov: I think that we have all witnessed a very important event, not only in Soviet-U.S. relations, but even on a world scale. Moreover, we expect it to produce very positive developments for international relations as a whole, not just for the USSR and the United States. Having said that, we do not yet have full agreement, but just "an agreement in principle" on the possibility of signing a treaty. In my view "in principle" means a great deal: It means that the major problems have been solved and that only technical details remain. The heads of the Soviet and U.S. delegations in Geneva have been given instructions to make things official. So, the agreement has not yet been completed, but this will not take long.

However, we must remain cautious. There is still a great deal of fairly difficult work to do before the final signing. I must remind you that, in the past, we have seen unexpected developments when agreements reached have not been carried through as a result of upheavals on the U.S. political stage. I would hate to see such a situation recur. If you look at what is happening in the United States, and at all the forces which have been mobilized against this agreement, you have every reason to think that the battle to conclude the treaty is not over. There is no problem on the Soviet side, but the problems are just beginning on the U.S. side.

Liberation: Shultz and Shevardnadze referred to the practical possibility of a second agreement, this time relating to strategic arms, from the first half of 1988, at

the end of which the USSR and the United States would halve their central arsenals. Does this mean that the USSR would agree to separate negotiations on offensive weapons and the problems linked to the SDI, contrary to the position adopted at both the Geneva and Reykjavik summits?

Bogdanov: I think that if we succeed in reaching agreement on the INF (the Euromissiles), we will have created a very favorable psychological climate for making great progress in the strategic nuclear arms sphere. Let us repeat that we have already agreed "in principle" to halve the Soviet and U.S. strategic arsenals. Obviously, all this can only be done provided the 1972 ABM Treaty has been strengthened in such a way that, over the next 10 years, neither side will try to violate it or overstep its limits.

In my view, there can be no compromise on the close link between the 50-percent reduction and the 1972 treaty. Moreover, this is common sense, because the two problems are logically interdependent. But, we are also very realistic, because we think that the SDI can encourage an offensive strategy, so much so that it would inevitably lead to a new arms race, which would have the one result of destroying all other arms limitation possibilities in other spheres. That is why we ought to examine this question very seriously.

Liberation: Even before Reykjavik, the USSR referred to the possibility of a moratorium on the SDI, and of a redefinition of laboratory experiments which are permitted, as opposed to operational research. Is there a possibility of compromise here?

Bogdanov: I think that your leaders know that on several occasions, including the latest Washington meeting, we told the Americans that we are prepared to discuss these subjects for negotiation to which you have just referred. We expect the Americans at least to express their views on this subject—what they think is possible and what is not.

USSR: IMPACT OF MISSILE CUTS ON SECURITY ARGUED

Bogdanov, UK Academic Debate

PM140839 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 Oct 87 Morning Edition p 6

["IZVESTIYA Round Table" discussion between IZVESTIYA correspondent A. Ostalskiy and Professor John Ericson, head of Edinburgh University Defense Research Center, and Professor Radomir Georgiyevich Bogdanov, deputy director of the USSR Academy of Sciences' United States of America and Canada Institute: "The Path to Disarmament Is Untrodden, But There Is No Alternative to It"; first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] From 28 through 30 September the latest "Edinburgh conversations" took place in Moscow. This is the name given to meetings between Soviet and British public and scientists from the two countries which have now become traditional. They were first held in 1980 in Edinburgh on the initiative of Edinburgh University and the Scotland-USSR Society with the participation of the Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations With Foreign Countries and the USSR-Britain Society. Since then they have taken place alternately in Britain and in our country. U.S. representatives have also taken part in them since 1983. At the end of the present meeting, the seventh, *Izvestiya* correspondent A. Ostalskiy chatted with two of its participants—Professor John Ericson, head of the Edinburgh University Defense Research Center, and Professor Radomir Georgiyevich Bogdanov, deputy director of the USSR Academy of Sciences' United States of America and Canada Institute.

[Ostalskiy] The "Edinburgh conversations" have always been distinguished by frankness and a free exchange of opinions. This time, certainly, varied viewpoints and varied opinions on how to survive in the nuclear age were also expressed. But on what points exactly did the meeting's participants agree with one another?

[Ericson] No one doubts the need to prevent nuclear war and reduce armaments. There is indisputably a general understanding of the importance of the agreement on medium-range and operational-tactical missiles—for the first time it is a question of a real reduction in nuclear arsenals and not a buildup. There is also the realization that this agreement must serve as a precedent, a model for future efforts.

[Bogdanov] We have embarked on a new phase of life. New thinking is being introduced into international politics. The path to disarmament is difficult and untrodden and we are at its very beginning. A whole group of conceptual discussions between us and our Western partners, who reflect the system of views which have taken shape in the West over the last 40 years, is taking place around the question of how to proceed further.

[Ostalskiy] The Soviet Union's concept, whether it is accepted in the West or not, is in any event clear. For us the final aim of the entire complex process of talks is a world free from nuclear weapons. What is the West's final aim from this viewpoint? Why does the idea of rejecting "nuclear deterrence" meet with such opposition?

[Ericson] I cannot speak on behalf of the West, I can only express the viewpoint of scientists who are tackling these problems.

[Bogdanov] Allow me to interrupt Professor Ericson, since it seems to me that he is too modest. He is one of the greatest experts on military-political problems and has sufficient knowledge to precisely reflect the way of thinking which exists in the West.

[Ericson] In the West there is a widespread view that nuclear weapons have preserved peace for a long time. Moreover, many people think that nuclear weapons are also necessary in the future to avoid war. They believe that the Soviet proposal to completely eliminate nuclear weapons is a dream and not a reality and that it is impossible to accept the Soviet position. They cite the USSR's superiority in conventional armaments.

Yet do nuclear weapons preserve peace? I think that this is not the point. We have managed to avoid war because both sides' vital fundamental interests have not come into insoluble opposition and conflict. Peace has been preserved not by weapons but by a policy of peace.

There is an obvious split between public opinion and the official viewpoint in the West. Western public opinion would like nuclear weapons to be destroyed. This split is increasing in connection with the appearance of the U.S. "Strategic Defense Initiative."

The public asks the question: If nuclear weapons serve to prevent war then why is SDI necessary? If SDI works, then the deterrent character of nuclear weapons is destroyed. Where is the logic here?

[Bogdanov] It must be admitted that the claim that the existence of nuclear weapons has prevented war for 40 years makes a strong impression on many people. But it is necessary to ask the question: What would have happened if nuclear weapons had not existed? I maintain that in this case there would not have been a war. For instance, prior to the beginning of the fifties the United States owned some dozen nuclear charges in total. If the

Soviet Union had intended to strike and seize Western Europe, could these dozen warheads have deterred the Soviet Armed Forces? The answer is clear: No, they could not. The whole point is that the Soviet side did not have any such intentions.

Now for the concept of nuclear deterrence in general. I call it not deterrence but the curse of deterrence. According to this concept, the sides must keep one another in a state of constant terror. How is this maintained? Only by constantly developing the arms race spiral and modernizing and improving nuclear weapons. That is the source of the arms race.

The concept of the "balance of forces"—that is, in the final analysis, in the nuclear context, the "balance of terror"—is acknowledged in the West. It seems to me that the time has come to give the world a more productive concept: a balance of interests. It is finally necessary to admit that the sides have their own legitimate vital interests. It is necessary to understand that in today's world there are no military solutions in our relations and any extension of the arms race is a quite useless waste of forces and money, since it does not bring political dividends, whereas bringing into force the principle of a balance of interests may enable political solutions to be found for any problems.

[Ostalskiy] Sometimes the impression arises that some people like to be members of the "nuclear club" and do not like to part with the privileged position of a nuclear power.

[Ericson] There are many aspects to this problem, including political, psychological, and even financial aspects. There are people who cannot reconcile themselves to the thought of parting with nuclear weapons. There is a real sense of belonging to a "nuclear club." Yet the threat of the future proliferation of nuclear weapons is real and is constantly growing. If you think about it, why do some have the right to own nuclear weapons and others do not? It is after all unjust. On the whole I think that the psychology of a select "nuclear club" is a reflection of the old stereotyped ways of thinking.

[Bogdanov] The possession of nuclear weapons has become a habit. Many people use the following argument: Nothing has happened for so many decades, so perhaps in the future there will not be a catastrophe. This logic is a serious obstacle to disarmament.

But I would ask the members of the "nuclear club": What has your club given mankind over 40 years? The role of world peacemaker has obviously not been successful. In the last 40 years there have been more than 100 local wars in the world, in which several million people have died. Moreover, with each decade the world is becoming more and more dangerous. The main source of this danger for all mankind, including this very "club," is nuclear weapons.

There are two means of disbanding the "nuclear club." The first is the elimination of nuclear weapons. The second is the proliferation of these weapons throughout the entire planet. In the second instance catastrophe will be not on our doorstep, but in our house, and no one will know whether he will wake up in the morning. The preferability of the first course is obvious.

[Ericson] I agree with this.

[Bogdanov] Incidentally, let me mention the financial side of the coin. Not everyone knows that nuclear weapons are the cheapest weapons in the world, as the Americans say, the kind of arms which "give more bang" per dollar. Conventional arms are much more costly.

[Ericson] The Western economy, and I think this is no secret, is not in the best shape at the moment. Therefore the financial burden of arms is a very serious factor which can in no way be left out of the calculations. There are definite grounds for concern in connection with the expenditure to preserve the balance in conventional armaments in Europe.

[Bogdanov] But morality must not be forgotten. No one disputes the immorality of nuclear weapons, although the financial difficulties can be understood. But I nonetheless believe that common sense will prevail. He who wants to survive will not trade his security and put his life in jeopardy for the sake of spending less.

[Ostalskiy] Thus, the West does not want to completely renounce nuclear weapons, but agrees with the need for the sides to reduce their nuclear arsenals with the aim of stepping up security. From this viewpoint, to what level is it necessary to reduce armaments? At what percentage does a "secure world" begin?

[Ericson] In English there is the expression: "You can't be a little bit pregnant." Either nuclear weapons will remain as a military-political factor with all the consequences attendant on this or not. Western public opinion thinks that nuclear weapons are immensely dangerous and that they cannot be protected by them. It seems to me that the gulf between the official viewpoint and Western public opinion's view of this problem will from now on grow and grow.

[Bogdanov] I do not have an answer to the question as to what reduction in nuclear armaments people in the West will consider sufficient for security. A complex series of political problems lies behind this question.

Many people in the West talk about a shift to completely defensive concepts. I doubt that it is possible to ensure reliable trustworthy defense while retaining nuclear weapons. The latter are aggressive by their very nature, since they can destroy huge masses of people and material assets and destroy whole cities.

[Ostalskiy] Now that the USSR and the United States have come close to reaching an agreement on the elimination of medium-range and operational-tactical missiles, alarm and nervousness on this score has suddenly broken out in West European official circles. But wasn't the "zero option" originally a Western proposal? In its time the siting of the Pershings and cruise missiles was presented in the West as a response to the Soviet SS-20 missiles, and the "zero option" as a means to restore the balance of forces. What has happened now?

[Ericson] It is easier for people to think in stereotypes. For some politicians and official figures the search for "disproportions" and disparities—in missiles, bombers, and chemical weapons—has become the main substance of their work. There is the idea in the West that with the elimination of medium-range and operational-tactical missiles Soviet superiority in conventional armaments is assuming a threatening character.

[Ostalskiy] Thus this problem did not exist prior to the appearance of medium-range missiles, and now it has arisen?

[Ericson] Yes, this seems really illogical, a paradox in its own way. The irony of the situation lies in the fact that NATO is criticizing its own policy.

One more factor. People in the West think that the cruise missiles and Pershings do not have particular value in a military context but are very useful in a political context. Certain people are now arguing about the West's "lag" and are demanding that cruise missiles be transferred to submarines and aircraft. But this would mean going round in circles or, rather, rising higher and higher in the arms race spiral. Certain people are almost getting used to higher levels of armaments and are frightened of backing down to previous levels.

[Bogdanov] I would answer this question simply: Either you want a reduction or you don't. The atmosphere, including the psychological atmosphere, needs to be ripe for a major agreement. The whole point is that the desire to resolve the problem of medium-range and operational-tactical missiles coincided with the public mood and with the mood of the ordinary man. Therefore the desire to reach an agreement proved irresistible, despite all the complexity and, I would say, circuitousness of the route by which the sides came to an accord.

I venture to disagree with Professor Ericson as regards the military aspect of this class of arms. You cannot deny that a Pershing-2 can reach Moscow in 6-8 minutes. Surely the elimination of this threat reduces the level of military confrontation? If these missiles cease to exist and the fear that the West may attempt to "decapitate" our country also ceases to exist, our partners need not fear that we will be forced to hit these missiles.

Now for the so-called overwhelming "Soviet superiority" in conventional arms. We cannot agree with this postulation. There is indeed a certain asymmetry. Certain hotheads in the United States say that it is necessary to resolve this problem by means of equalization—that is, NATO must build up these arms to a specified level and then hold talks on reductions. We suggest, as it seems to me, the most logical reasonable way: Let us eliminate existing asymmetries, going down rather than up, directly embarking on mutual reductions, and let us reduce the level of confrontation while at the same time preserving overall parity in the course of this process.

[Ustalskiy] You sometimes hear skeptical remarks about the feasibility of this thinking. There are Western scientists who think that there is nothing new in it with the exception of the category of interdependence proposed by the Soviet Union. What do the participants in your meeting think about this? Incidentally, what does this interdependence represent from your viewpoint?

[Ericson] Interdependence is simple. Either you all live together, or you all die together. It is impossible to build your own security on other people's lack of security. Very acute economic and ecological problems which demand joint actions by all mankind also come into it.

As regards the skepticism toward the new thinking, it goes back to the same problem—habitual old stereotypes.

Official Western circles express concern in connection with the USSR's "propaganda offensive and propaganda initiatives." I do not consider the Soviet position on disarmament questions to be "propaganda." I think that it is the expression of a real feasible policy. Western public opinion demands that serious and adequate answers are given to the Soviet proposals.

[Bogdanov] It seems to me that sometimes they try to ascribe to the new thinking something which is not there. The principles of the new thinking are currently being consolidated in Soviet foreign policy; this process is still not finished, it is closely linked with our domestic restructuring, which has only just begun.

In my opinion, one of the strongest sides of the new political thinking is its openness to discussions. We have no monopoly on truth. We do not reject ideas merely because they originate from the other side but are ready to accept them if they have a grain of reason in them. We also invite the other side to relate in a similar fashion to ideas coming from us.

So at the "Edinburgh conversations," which have just finished, we did not involve ourselves with shifting the responsibility for the negative factors onto one another but tried to discard the stereotypes which have taken shape. We must all declare a real war on them together! It seems to me that it will be impossible to build a new system of international relations without smashing stereotypes.

Security Will Increase

PM131057 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 Oct 87 First Edition p 3

[Own Observer M. Ponomarev article under the rubric "International Observer Answers Reader: 'We Will Not Forgo Our Defense Interests'--first three paragraphs are reader's letter and editorial introduction]

[Text] War and labor veteran A. Smirnov from Elektrostal City sent the editorial bureau the following letter:

"I learned with great interest that the USSR and the United States have reached agreement in principle to eliminate medium-range and operational-tactical missiles. But surely, judging by press reports, our country will have to destroy a far larger number of such missiles and their nuclear charges than the United States. Will this not affect the security of the Soviet Union and its allies? Will an adequate level of defense be maintained?"

Reader A. Smirnov is answered by *Krasnaya Zvezda* Observer M. Ponomarev.

The agreement in principle to eliminate medium-range and operational-tactical missiles reached at the talks between E.A. Shevardnadze and G. Shultz in Washington is of exceptionally great importance, Comrade Smirnov. Not only for the Soviet Union and the United States, but for the entire world. After all, it is a question of practical actions to save mankind from nuclear weapons and other means of mass destruction.

Of course, the elimination of two classes of Soviet and U.S. missiles is just the first step toward this goal. It is still not a very big step—it is a question of destroying approximately 2,000 warheads—only a small proportion of all nuclear arsenals, which already total around 50,000 charges. But every journey starts with a first step, and that is precisely the purport and importance of the Soviet-U.S. accord. It is the first step on the right road leading mankind away from the edge of the nuclear abyss.

Embarking on this road was not easy. The inertia of old thinking displayed by our partners in the talks on nuclear and space arms is very great. Very influential and aggressive forces blinded by their hatred for everything progressive will oppose the achievement of sensible accords between our countries. But the Soviet leadership has realized that without such accords the nuclear arms race not only will not come to an end but will become even larger in scope and will undermine still further the security of all peoples, including our Soviet people, since in the modern world the security of each depends on the security of all.

Purposefully striving for movement toward a nuclear-free world, the Soviet Union agreed to destroy a larger number of missiles and nuclear charges than our partners in the talks. The Soviet Union has thereby shown in practice that it firmly adheres to the line . . . indicating the imbalance in certain arms spheres by eliminating, so to speak, the "surpluses" rather than making up for the "shortages."

Having reached agreement with the United States on the mutual destruction of two classes of nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union has in no way forgone its security interests or the security of its allies. Our country has adequate guarantees to ensure that defense is maintained at a reliable level.

This confidence is based on many facts. I have already mentioned one: Security is not weakened but strengthened when nuclear arsenals are reduced. An agreement on medium-range and operational-tactical missiles could be a good prelude to progress at the talks on major—50%—reductions in strategic offensive weapons under the conditions of the strict observance of the ABM Treaty. Agreement on this score could be reached in the first half of next year. This would be yet another step—and an extremely important one—on the road toward a nuclear-free world and the strengthening of universal security.

Other circumstances should also be kept in mind. "Global double-zero"—the formula being used to describe the Soviet-U.S. accord—means that the elimination of Soviet missiles, the SS-20's and SS-4's for instance, is tied to the elimination of the U.S. Pershing-2 and medium-range ground-launched cruise missiles. After all, the Pershing-2 missiles are a first-strike nuclear weapon and therefore very dangerous because they have a very short flight time—6-8 minutes—and a range that covers a large part of the European territory of the USSR. A serious threat is also posed by cruise missiles—

they are hard to detect using modern ABM systems, owing to their small radar signature and low-altitude flight pattern. The eradication of both types of medium-range missiles would lead to a definite reduction in the threat of a surprise, nuclear first strike.

The elimination of operational-tactical missiles should also serve to strengthen security. It is well known that the United States intended to site a new generation of such missiles—the Pershing 1-B's—in Europe. Apart from the fact that they could strike virtually the entire territory of the Warsaw Pact countries (excluding the USSR), it was also important that in the space of just 48 hours these missiles could have been refitted as medium-range missiles—Pershing-2's.

Thus, zero missiles of either class held by the Soviet Union will mean that the United States will also have no missiles in either class. So how could the USSR's security be said to have been weakened?

The following point should also be borne in mind. The implementation of the Soviet-U.S. accord will not disrupt the overall military-strategic parity between the USSR and the United States. Only its level will be somewhat lower. Parity in the sphere of strategic offensive weapons, which form the basis of both sides' combat might, will be fully maintained. Nor does the agreement in Washington affect either side's armed forces and conventional arms. Strategic stability between our countries is maintained and, consequently, security is not damaged.

In general, Comrade Smirnov, both Soviet and U.S. scientists have come to the conclusion on the basis of the special research they have conducted that 95% of all Soviet and U.S. nuclear arms could be scrapped without disrupting stability in any way. The Soviet Union is convinced that even this 5% is not necessary—we must seek completely different foundations for stability and security.

These foundations were set out in M.S. Gorbachev's article "Reality and Guarantees for a Secure World," to which we will often return, since it reflects the very essence of all our current thinking on the fate of peace. It is pertinent to also cite the document "On the Warsaw Pact States' Military Doctrine." This doctrine is subordinated to the task of preventing war—both nuclear and conventional. The USSR and the other Warsaw Pact states consider the reliable safeguarding of their peoples' security to be their prime task.

In light of the questions posed in your letter, Comrade Smirnov, it is very important to stress that the armed forces of the USSR and the other Warsaw Pact states maintain a level of combat readiness adequate to avoid being taken by surprise. If any aggressors were to stage an attack they would be crushingly rebuffed.

This conclusion, reached at the conference of the Warsaw Pact states' Political Consultative Committee held in Berlin at the end of May, still wholly retains its impact. The Soviet-U.S. accord on the elimination of two classes of nuclear weapons and the signing and implementation of a corresponding agreement will in no way weaken it. The security of the Soviet Union and its friends will not weaken but increase. What has already been done proves that the idea of creating a comprehensive system of international peace and security is starting to take on real shape.

/8309

CSO: 52001003

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

SOVIET COMMENTATOR WARNS AGAINST OVEROPTIMISM

PM161317 Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI in Russian No 42, 18 Oct 87 (Sig Press 13 Oct 87) p 5

[Yuriy Bandura "Observer's Remarks": "The Labyrinths of the Washington Accord. Before G. Shultz' Visit to Moscow"]

[Text] Accord in principle on the elimination of two classes of nuclear weapons—medium- and shorter-range missiles with an operational range between 500 and 5,000 km—was reached at the Soviet-U.S. talks held in Washington recently.

Approximately 2,000 warheads are due to be eliminated. This represents about 2-3% of the stocks in the planet's nuclear arsenals. The figure will be considerably higher for Europe. It seems that we are talking about an operation which is impressive even in terms of its physical parameters.

The Soviet Union is due to destroy many more medium- and shorter-range missile combat charges than the United States. This looks like an obvious inequality. But it is impossible not to take into account the fact that the U.S. side is due to eliminate Pershing-2 and cruise missiles with an operational range of 2,500 km in a flight time of only 5-8 minutes. Almost the entire European part of the USSR falls within their range today. Is the elimination of these weapons consonant with the interests of our security? Without any doubt. Consequently, the imbalance of reductions in this case is justified, especially in view of the fact that it does not involve any weakening of guarantees of the security of the USSR and its allies.

Furthermore, it is well known that, in the process of planned reductions, the Soviet side will not destroy a single missile capable of reaching U.S. territory. Some people in the United States perceive this fact as a reason to claim that the "exchange" is strategically unbalanced and that the elimination of medium- and shorter-range missiles contains a threat to America solely by virtue of the fact that it enhances the security of the Soviets. What is the answer to such arguments? It is perhaps contained in the words spoken by U.S. Secretary of State Shultz: "The Soviets are undertaking much greater reductions than we are.... How can it be said that our military

position will deteriorate if they eliminate almost 2,000 warheads while we eliminate about 350?" It also seems worth remembering that a U.S. military contingent numbering 300,000 men is stationed in West Europe, that hundreds of thousands of Americans live there on a more or less permanent basis doing strictly civilian jobs, and that a substantial proportion of U.S. material wealth—the property of U.S. transnational corporations—is also located there. The elimination of medium- and shorter-range missiles will mean that they will no longer be targets.

Finally, West Europe. It is not difficult to realize what the implementation of the Washington accord would mean for it, bearing in mind everything said in West European capitals about Soviet medium-range missiles over the last 10 years. They were perceived as almost the greatest threat to the Old World. The elimination of medium- and shorter-range missiles is capable of removing this cause of worry, which was only exacerbated when U.S. Pershings and cruise missiles started being sited in West Europe.

For all these reasons the Washington accord cannot fail to generate feelings of satisfaction at a victory for common sense over the dogmas held by Richard supporters of the old thinking. The satisfaction is even more tangible due to the fact that the future of the missiles was decided over a long period of time, with difficulty and at times acrimony. There were occasions when doors were slammed, when they parted for long periods, and people even asked: Could they have parted forever?

On the whole, these difficulties are now behind us. It does seem possible to sigh with relief. But there should be no delusions, either: A whole series of stages must still be gone through from the accord between the heads of the USSR and U.S. diplomatic departments to the actual implementation of this accord, and each one of these stages is fraught with surprises.

The work in Geneva on coordinating the remaining technical questions has yet to be finalized. Their complexity should not be dramatized, but M. Thatcher's hint ought to be borne in mind. She was asked: "Do you see no more serious obstacles to agreements on medium-range weapons?" Her reply was: "Of course there are always serious obstacles because as soon as people get down to 'trivialities' and start dealing with details, everything becomes terribly complicated."

The completion of the work on the draft medium- and shorter-range missile treaty still lies ahead. But how many most important international documents have been almost ready for signing and simply failed to materialize? Let us recall just the fate of the tripartite talks on a complete and universal nuclear test ban: Way back in August 1978 the USSR, the United States, and Britain proclaimed with great optimism that there had been considerable success in preparing a corresponding document and, specifically, agreement had been reached on banning all nuclear weapon tests. But in November 1980 the United States refused to continue the talks.

The visit by the U.S. secretary of state to Moscow still lies ahead, and it would be premature to predict an unquestionably positive outcome for his mission. In any case, in a recent interview with *The Washington Times*, R. Reagan did not rule out the possibility of a fruitless outcome to the Moscow talks.

Only the crossing of all these "Rubicons"—which are perfectly capable of being forded "on the move"—will make it possible to hold the new Soviet-U.S. summit meeting which was scheduled for this fall.

If this third meeting between Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan does take place, a medium- and shorter-range missile treaty will become reality. But will it become an actual and effective reality? The difficulty in answering this question can be judged by the fate of the SALT II Treaty: It was signed during the June 1979 Soviet-U.S. summit meeting, but it is still not ratified by the United States, just like the treaties between the two countries on the limitation of nuclear weapon tests (1974) and on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes (1976). Could a similar fate await the medium- and shorter-range missile treaty? Alas, there are few reasons to categorically deny such an outcome to the dialogue.

I would like to hope that any fears on this account will prove to have been groundless. In any case, pretty responsible and competent people are now speaking in Washington of ratification as almost an accomplished fact. But even if this stage is reached, would it be possible to consider the fate of medium- and shorter-range missiles decided finally and for all time? That same hitherto unhappy experience in relations with the United States

hints with a sly grin: "Remember the ABM Treaty." Signed and ratified, it still remains a target for attempts on its life in the United States....

Is it worth raking up the past at a time when one would like to succumb to the euphoria of freedom from the medium- and shorter-range missile problem? Were this problem to be really solved—unambiguously, reliably, and finally—memory maybe could be relieved of its vigilant duty. But for the time being.... For the time being, there is only one thing that can be said with any certainty: The tough confrontation in the medium- and shorter-range missile sphere, which consumed so much physical and intellectual efforts both in the USSR and in the United States, did not prevent Moscow and Washington from coming to an accord. Hence the question: Is it worth allowing the experience gained in the talks on medium- and shorter-range missiles to disappear without a trace and to start from the very beginning on every single one of the "damned questions" perturbing the world? This is a rhetorical question. One of the most important practical conclusions to be drawn from the situation around medium- and shorter-range missiles is: Dialogue alone can be fruitful, while confrontation is irrational and fraught with common misfortune.

This is not a new conclusion. But by no means has everyone reached it yet.

/8309

CSO: 52001003

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

USSR: SHULTZ MEETINGS, TALKS IN MOSCOW

Shultz Arrives

LD220711 Moscow TASS in English 0703 GMT 22 Oct 87

[Text] Moscow October 22 TASS—U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz arrived in Moscow today.

Shultz and his wife, who came by train from Helsinki, were met at the railway terminal by Yuliy Vorontsov, first deputy minister of foreign affairs of the USSR, Aleksander Bessmertnykh, deputy foreign minister, Soviet ambassador to the United States Yuriy Dubinin, and other officials.

The welcoming party included U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union Jack Matlock.

Carlucci Arrival Noted

LD220933 Moscow TASS in English 0828 GMT 22 Oct 87

[Text] Moscow October 22 TASS—U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz and wife, and U.S. Presidential National Security Adviser Frank Carlucci have arrived in Moscow from Helsinki by train today.

They were welcomed at the railway terminal by Yuliy Vorontsov, USSR first deputy foreign minister, Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, USSR deputy foreign minister, and USSR Ambassador to the USA Yuriy Dubinin, and other officials.

Among the welcoming party was U.S. Ambassador to the USSR Jack Matlock.

Discussions Begin

LD220836 Moscow TASS in English 0834 GMT 22 Oct 87

[Text] Moscow October 22 TASS—Talks have opened here today between Eduard Shevardnadze, member of the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee, USSR foreign minister, and U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz.

Taking part in the talks is secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Anatoliy Dobrynin.

George Shultz arrived in Moscow in the morning today.

Chernyshev Comments

LD211643 Moscow TASS in English 1616 GMT 21 Oct 87

["Five Questions to Mr Shultz"—TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow October 21 TASS—TASS Military News Analyst Vladimir Chernyshev writes:

U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz is due to arrive in Moscow. His visit is viewed everywhere in the world as an important step which can potentially ensure the USSR's and the United States' advance in reduction of armaments. There is no doubt that the range of questions on the agenda of the meeting will be broad. It appears that from the viewpoint of further prospects there are sufficient facts and indications which make one both hopeful and wary.

Above all, mention should be made of the available realistic possibility of attaining mutual accord on still outstanding questions of the would-be treaty on elimination of medium- and shorter-range missiles. The sides, for instance, so far hold different opinions on how to formulate concretely the solution of the problem of American nuclear warheads for the West German Pershing-1A missiles. There are also divergencies on questions of control. And, nevertheless, one should like to hope that the heads of foreign policy departments of the USSR and the United States will not have to spend much time to finally thrash out the details of the treaty.

I would ask the secretary of state the question on how the U.S. Administration treats the so-called "measures", for the American missiles which are to be eliminated in Western Europe in accordance with the would-be treaty. Is it not an attempt to create beforehand possibilities for bypassing the would-be agreement? I think that this problem should give rise to serious concern.

But this is not the only question. Much is being spoken in the United States and other NATO countries on the need of elimination of chemical weapons. The USSR, on its part, is doing its utmost to make a joint practical step in this direction. The White House has just announced the decision to start the assembly of binary chemical shells, that is to make operational the newest type of chemical weapons. How does this decision match with official Washington's assurances on its desire to follow the way of elimination of chemical weapons?

The USSR and the United States have agreed to start before December 1 full-scale negotiations on limitation and, in the final account, full termination of nuclear tests. Officials in Washington assert that the ultimate goal can be reached only in the 21st century. Moreover, at the recent hearings in Congress a high-placed representative of the U.S. Department of Energy overtly stated that the tests would give the West a possibility to get advantage over the Soviet Union in the exclusively important new stage of development of military technology. Do not such statements call in question the readiness of the U.S. Administration to sincerely conduct the above negotiations?

Some people in NATO lament that the elimination of American missiles in Europe would allegedly add to the "threat" from the USSR's conventional armaments and troops. Officials "insist" on reductions of conventional armaments. But how do they view this in Washington and other capitals of the North Atlantic alliance? Only as "elimination of the disbalance" on the part of the USSR! The NATO countries are going to perfect and build up their own armaments. Is such an approach realistic? With the general approximate equality of the forces between the Warsaw Treaty Organisation and NATO, the disbalance is in some spheres in favour of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation, and in other spheres—in NATO's favour. Hence the solution of the question can take place only provided relevant reductions from both sides. For instance, if the West Europeans, as they say, feel concern over a greater number of tanks of the Warsaw Treaty, we should show no lesser concern over the NATO's advantage in such a type of offensive armaments as strike aviation. The question arises: Are the United States and NATO ready for solution of the problem of conventional armaments and armed forces on a really fair, equitable basis?

And, finally, the Soviet Union and the United States agreed to undertake vigorous efforts in elaborating an accord on 50 per cent reduction of strategic offensive armaments. George Shultz said that this question was the main one for his visit. But is the American side ready to make a headway in its solution? It retains the main obstacle on the way—its refusal to consolidate the ABM Treaty regime. The reduction of strategic offensive armaments is incompatible with proliferation of the arms race to outer space. It is impossible without the strict compliance with the ABM Treaty. Our country proposed compromise solutions, providing for consoli-

dation of the treaty regime on the basis of mutual obligations on non-withdrawal from it for ten years. It has been proposed to agree on boundaries between activities, allowed and disallowed by the treaty, to agree upon the list of devices which would be disallowed for launching into outer space, including for tests. Exactly these proposals might well be the basis for a way out of the impasse in the question on consolidation of the ABM Treaty regime which, in its turn, would enable solution of the question on a 50-per cent reduction of strategic offensive armaments.

But the American side continues clinging to its hardened, non-constructive stand, rejecting even the discussion of the compromise Soviet proposal. Washington's official representatives say one thing—the United States intends to work out SDI as soon as possible and to deploy it as soon as it is ready. Moreover, the Pentagon has recently announced the decision to hold a "demonstration show", in other words, tests of some SDI elements, which would be a violation of the spirit and the letter of the ABM Treaty. May Washington hope for a headway towards reduction of strategic offensive armaments if it retains such a stand? From what come such hopes, which have been lately announced by the U.S. secretary of state?

Maybe answers are to be found in portfolios of the American 100-man "team" that the U.S. secretary of state will bring with him to Moscow. One should not like to suppose that American representatives are arriving in our capital without any compromise proposals.

Marks 'Eve of Major Step'

PM221030 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 22 Oct 87 Morning Edition p 6

[N. Vasilyev article: "On the Eve of an Important New Stage"]

[Text] In accordance with the agreement reached, U.S. Secretary of State G. Shultz arrives in Moscow 22 October for a working visit. It is scarcely an exaggeration to say that the Soviet leadership's forthcoming talks with the high-ranking representative of the U.S. Administration are arousing heightened interest in the world. This is due to a number of factors.

First of all, international relations are themselves at a major turning point. On the one hand, there is a greater need than ever before to set limits to the growth of confrontational tendencies and the accelerated stockpiling of the means of destruction, to abandon the stereotypes of hostility, and to restructure mutual relations between states on the basis of the new thinking, taking into account the carefully weighed balance of all the participants' interests. On the other hand, important encouraging signs have appeared, suggesting that the awareness of the need for such changes is growing stronger in the international community and is being incorporated in the practical policy of more and more countries—be they in East or West, North or South.

Naturally, Soviet-U.S. relations are a significant factor, a kind of lens through which the trends in the present stage of development are focused.

In these relations, after a prolonged phase of confrontation which filled the hearts of millions of people with alarm, new shoots are beginning to appear and the prerequisites for constructive changes have sprung up.

The Soviet Union has always advocated the leveling out and the stable, constructive development of relations with the United States on the basis of equality, mutual security, and mutual advantage. It is no secret that such crucial stages in the Soviet-U.S. summit level dialogue such as Geneva and Reykjavik were possible thanks largely to the Soviet leadership's persistent efforts. These contacts, which took place through major Soviet initiatives, first and foremost in the key sector of security, showed how far it would be possible for our two countries to progress—and to help all mankind to progress—toward a nuclear-free, just world, given the corresponding will on the part of our U.S. partners.

The fact that practical results in the sphere of real—first and foremost nuclear—disarmament are not a myth, but an attainable goal, was shown by the Soviet-U.S. talks held in Washington in September of this year. They were characterized by a businesslike mood and by efforts on both sides, which made it possible to achieve an accord in principle on the first agreement in history on the elimination of entire classes of nuclear arms—medium- and shorter-range missiles.

It was this accord, as well as the progress in a number of other important spheres, that made the U.S. secretary of state's visit to Moscow both possible and necessary, and determined its agenda.

Soviet-U.S. relations are thus on the eve of a major step in the cause of real nuclear disarmament, and that is another reason for the atmosphere of anticipation and hope in which the Moscow talks are beginning.

In its resolution on the results of USSR Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze's talks with the U.S. President and secretary of state in Washington, the CPSU Central Committee Politburo particularly noted the importance of successfully completing work on a treaty on medium-range and operational-tactical missiles. In the event of success this could lead to a kind of chain reaction and give a powerful boost to progress in other, still more important avenues of ensuring security. In particular, the USSR and the United States agreed to attach priority at the Moscow talks to a radical—one-half—reduction in their strategic offensive arms. This truly Herculean task can only be resolved given strict, rigorous compliance with the ABM Treaty, which is the cornerstone of strategic stability.

Finding mutually acceptable solutions in this core area of Soviet and U.S. security will, in turn, make it possible to increase the pace in other spheres of arms limitation, reduction, and elimination where some groundwork has already been done.

Naturally, the month that has elapsed between the Washington talks and the Moscow talks was no ordinary month, but was filled with heightened political, negotiating, and also propagandist activity. The results are to be summed up in Moscow.

Of course, at the moment it is premature to speculate, still more to launch into predictions about the possible results of the forthcoming talks. I would only like to dwell on one aspect of considerable importance—the propaganda background in the West, which is being created spontaneously in some places and deliberately in others on the eve of the secretary of state's visit to the USSR.

One of its natural components is the remarks made by U.S. officials. This time they are more cautious and considered than usual. In particular, the discussion which is beginning is assessed as capable of leading to "historic" results and far-reaching progress not only in Soviet-U.S. relations, but in the world climate as a whole.

Nor can there be any objection to the objective exposition of the relevant U.S. positions, including the aspects in which they differ from Soviet positions. But there is a patent lack of objectivity. The same old primitive method, repeated a thousand times, prevails: The United States acts and does everything correctly, its conduct is ideal, whereas the USSR... Once again the newspapers and television screens are full of far-fetched misrepresentations and distortions. At the same time skepticism is vigorously promoted and doubts are sown as to the correctness of the administration's intention of reaching an accord with the USSR on the elimination of two classes of nuclear arms. Here influential forces have evidently joined in the game, seeking at all costs to prevent any accord between our countries and to push the world back into the quagmire of confrontation.

It is evidently at their instigation that articles like that in *The New York Times* are printed, in which people are threatened that by making an agreement on medium-range and operational-tactical missiles the United States is "destroying the balance that has helped us to avoid wars, and is thereby intensifying the danger of war."

A division of duties can be seen here. Some critics of a treaty—they include many of those who enjoy the reputation of being hawks—attack it directly. They have worked out a whole collection of theses such as the fabrications about Soviet superiority in conventional and chemical weapons, which is supposedly neutralized

at present by the U.S. medium- and shorter-range nuclear missiles, and they constantly quote the unsubstantiated argument about the "decoupling" of U.S. and West European security.

Other "fans" of the nuclear race operate more subtly, in a roundabout way. They are now trying to cast aspersions on the Soviet Union's adherence to an honorable accord based on parameters including those agreed during the Washington talks, and whisper about a supposed "departure" by the USSR from the agreed positions and the Soviet Union's desire to "demand" an exorbitant price at the last minute. These circles' tactics are dictated partly by the desire to undermine support for a treaty, including its possible future ratification, and partly by the attempt to conceal certain zigzags in the negotiating positions of the United States itself. In any event, this whole campaign is aimed at complicating the situation on the eve of the Moscow talks.

The suspicion creeps in that the opponents of an agreement see the destruction of 2-3% of the Soviet and U.S. nuclear arsenals (and that is what the medium- and shorter-range missiles amount to) as the precursor of a danger which is far more threatening from the viewpoint of the military-industrial complex and the "cold war lobby"—the start of a radical reduction in strategic offensive arms and an accord on preventing the militarization of space.

In this connection I remember the most dramatic moment of the Reykjavik meeting, when the sides were literally 5 minutes away from a historic breakthrough to a nuclear-free world, but the U.S. leadership's unwillingness to renounce its "Star Wars" program prevented that step from being taken. Since then there has been no standstill in nuclear disarmament talks, chiefly thanks to the consistent efforts of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, and the best proof of this is the agenda for the Moscow talks, which we have already spoken of. But the U.S. military-industrial complex continues to defend the last bastion, space, with real ferocity.

But it should be understood that without strict compliance with the ABM Treaty radical reductions in strategic offensive arms would be impossible. That would be contrary to simple logic. In a period in which we are embarking on the actual elimination of nuclear weapons, each side, including the United States, must have a guarantee that during that period neither side will seek military superiority—through space or by any other means.

In a word, it is now necessary not to invent additional arguments in favor of keeping nuclear arms and extending the arms race to new spheres, but to concentrate efforts on reaching concrete agreements designed to lower the level of military confrontation, strengthen stability, and create a new climate in Soviet-U.S. relations.

This in turn would be a weighty contribution by our two countries to the creation of a model for ensuring national security which does not threaten the world with a worldwide catastrophe, a model for which the concept is set forth comprehensively in M.S. Gorbachev's article "Reality and Guarantees for a Secure World."

The Soviet Union, for its part, is prepared to act in the most responsible way, and our words about our desire to use the unique chance that is offered to the USSR and the United States will not diverge from our deeds.

It is important in this connection that the USSR and the United States have arrived at a mutual understanding concerning the basis for the development of dialogue, including summit dialogue, which envisages specifically the attainment of practical results as the logical conclusion to talks on nuclear and space arms. In the Soviet side's opinion the conclusion of a treaty on medium-range and operational-tactical missiles and the drawing up of key parameters for interconnected solutions to the question of deep reductions in strategic offensive arms and strict compliance with the ABM Treaty should be a reliable basis for continuing the work that was begun in Geneva and taken to a radically new level in Reykjavik.

Pyadyshev Interviewed

LD221614 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1522 GMT 22 Oct 87

[Text] Moscow, 22 Oct (TASS)—At the Soviet-U.S. talks which began today, the Soviet side favors energetic and constructive measures to remove all obstacles toward working out an agreement on the liquidation of Soviet and U.S. medium- and short-range missiles. This was stated today by Boris Pyadyshev, first deputy chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry Information Directorate, in an interview to a TASS diplomatic correspondent.

The USSR Foreign Ministry representative noted that elements of a constructive approach toward questions being discussed can also be ascertained in the U.S. delegation's position. In order to assist USSR Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz on the most important problems which they are discussing at the talks, several groups of experts of the two countries have been created and have already started work.

After the completion of the first day of talks, representatives of the ministers will hold a briefing for Soviet and foreign journalists.

U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz arrived in Moscow this morning in order to conduct talks with USSR Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze. The talks are expected to end tomorrow.

Shultz, Shevardnadze Talks

LD221954 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1800 GMT 22 Oct 87

[Text] The talks between Eduard Amvrosiyevich Shevardnadze, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR foreign minister, and U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz started today. The sides are focusing on issues related to the problems of reducing and liquidating nuclear arms, strengthening the ABM Treaty, and other issues pertaining to the area of security.

During the course of today's discussion, which was conducted in a businesslike and constructive spirit, the results of the work that has been done so far by the delegation of the USSR and United States at the Geneva talks on nuclear and space weapons were summed up, particular attention was given to preparing the text of an accord on liquidating Soviet and U.S. medium- and short-range missiles, in light of the basic agreement attained in this area during the meeting between the USSR foreign minister and the U.S. secretary of state this September in Washington. In particular, the issues which the delegations have failed to harmonize completely in Geneva were examined in detail. The sides also paid great attention to other steps in the sphere of arms limitation and reduction. In this connection it was stated that progress in the matter of working out an agreement on a 50% reduction of strategic offensive arms could impart a new impulse to the talks across the entire series of the problems of disarmament.

The Soviet side stated that progress in this direction and, moreover, in the nearest future, is possible on the basis of mutual adherence to the principle of equality and equal security, which indisputably presupposes strict observation of the ABM Treaty.

The U.S. side made reservations, evidencing the persistent striving of the U.S. for creating [sozdaniye] space weapons which are outside the limits of the treaty. At the same time, there is understanding about the intensification of work on agreements on strategic offensive weapons and space which would be acceptable to the two sides.

The talks between Eduard Amvrosiyevich Shevardnadze and George Shultz were mainly conducted with a limited number of participants: On the Soviet side—Dobrynin, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and Ilesmertnykh, USSR deputy foreign minister; and on the U.S. side—Carlucci, and Ridgway, assistant secretary of state.

A plenary session was also conducted in which other officials took part: on the Soviet side—Vorontsov, Dubinin, Karpov, chief of the Problems of Arms Control and Disarmament Department of the USSR Foreign Ministry; Stepanov, assistant to the USSR foreign minister; Tarasenko, chief of the General Secretariat of the USSR

Foreign Ministry; Sukhodrev, deputy chief of the United States of America and Canada Department; and on the U.S. side—Matlock; Nitze and Browne, special advisors to the U.S. President and U.S. secretary of state on the Geneva talks; Ridgway and Holmes, U.S. assistant secretaries of state; Adelman, director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; and Kampelman, head of the U.S. delegation at the talks on nuclear and space arms in Geneva.

The ministers formed joint groups of experts which were instructed to discuss and complete the technical aspects of problems which are the subject of the Moscow talks. The talks will be continued.

Eduard Amvrosiyevich Shevardnadze hosted a luncheon in honor of George Shultz and his party. Yazov, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR defense minister; Dobrynin, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee; Kamentsev, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers; leaders of a number of USSR ministries and departments; participants in the talks on the Soviet and U.S. sides; and other officials attended the luncheon.

Redman, Gerasimov Briefing

LD221958 Moscow TASS in English 1942 GMT 22 Oct 87

[Text] Moscow October 22 TASS—A TASS diplomatic correspondent reports:

It is, perhaps, for the first time in the history of the Press Centre of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs that Soviet and foreign journalists who gathered for a briefing witnessed how it was held by two persons at once, spokesmen for the United States and the Soviet Union.

They also noticed that Charles Redman, a State Department official, and Gennadiy Gerasimov, head of the Information Directorate of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, cooperated splendidly and in a gentlemanly manner gave each other an opportunity to take the floor.

But, for sure, the main thing was that their evaluations of the results of the first day of the talks between George Shultz and Eduard Shevardnadze coincided, in the main: Today's meeting was held in a businesslike and constructive atmosphere and good progress was achieved at the talks.

Mr Redman said that Eduard Shevardnadze and George Shultz agreed that today's meeting was held in a businesslike and constructive atmosphere and sufficient progress was achieved at the talks.

"The Soviet side feels optimistic and regards it as the principal aim of today's meeting in Moscow to finalise the work to prepare a treaty to eliminate medium- and shorter-range missiles, to make considerable headway on matters aimed at reducing offensive arms and at maintaining the regime of the ABM Treaty," Gennadiy Gerasimov said, for his part.

Universal attention was attracted to the judgement of George Shultz quoted at the briefing: The Soviet-U.S. summit meeting in Reykjavik, of all meetings in Soviet-American relations, had produced probably the greatest result, and that the Reykjavik summit had given the impetus thanks to which the two sides met in Washington and were conducting talks in Moscow.

Of course, the journalists wanted to learn more details about the essence of the two foreign ministers' talks and of what was discussed in eight working groups. Numerous questions concerned not only disarmament issues, where the possibility of reaching agreement to eliminate medium- and shorter-range missiles was pointed out with particular optimism, but also such vital issues of our times as human rights and regional conflicts.

One can understand the desire of a correspondent from Kuwait to find out the attitude of the U.S. and Soviet spokesmen to today's report on an Iranian missile strike against his country.

The interest in a new Nobel Prize winner in the field of literature, Iosif Brodskiy, is understandable, too.

However, both Charles Redman and Gennadiy Gerasimov showed understandable restraint: The talks are not yet over.

Yet another strenuous work day lies ahead tomorrow, and the central event of it, undoubtedly, will be a meeting between Mikhail Gorbachev and the U.S. secretary of state.

Preview of Shultz-Gorbachev

LD230828 Moscow TASS in English 0822 GMT 23 Oct 87

[Text] Moscow October 23 TASS—A TASS diplomatic correspondent reports:

Since the early morning on Friday, the second day of a USSR-U.S. meeting in Moscow, the telephone lines to the senior officials of the Soviet Foreign Ministry's Information Directorate have been busy, indicating a tremendous interest in this highly important event, with everyone eager to hear the latest news.

But we have still been able to put a call through to Boris Pyadyshev, first deputy chief of the directorate.

"The central event on the second day of the talks will, of course, be a meeting between Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz," he said.

"During this meeting they will discuss issues in substance, perspective and a broad context. They will first of all talk about concluding work on an agreement to scrap intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles.

"Besides, attention will definitely be paid to this issue of reducing offensive arms and preserving the regime of the ABM Treaty. The meeting will also discuss the range of matters concerning the relationship between the two major powers, the Soviet Union and the United States," Pyadyshev said.

The phone at the press center of the U.S. delegation, which is in room 312 at Moscow's Ukraine Hotel, was answered by Richard Gilbert, press attache of the American Embassy. He said the Soviet foreign minister and the U.S. secretary of state today had resumed their talks at 9.30 and that the expert groups had continued their work at the same time. They at the U.S. press center are waiting for the results of the historic meeting with impatience as well.

After the Kremlin meeting George Shultz will continue his talks with Eduard Shevardnadze. The expert groups will go back to work, too. Later the U.S. secretary of state will give a news conference, to be followed by a meeting with the press by the Soviet foreign minister, and Soviet and foreign correspondents in Moscow are preparing to cover the two events.

Shultz and accompanying officials plan to fly out of Moscow tonight, but the city is still enveloped in a dense fog and it cannot be ruled out that they will again have to use the rail service.

An extended stay in Moscow, it is believed, is also possible due to the large amount of issues to be discussed.

One would certainly like to hope that the difficulties of the talks will prove just as negotiable as those posed by the unusual weather in Moscow.

Gorbachev, Shultz Meeting

LD231036 Moscow World Service in English 1000 GMT 23 Oct 87

[Text] A meeting between General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev and George Shultz continues here in Moscow. According to a Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman, the meeting deals with the important issues of international relations. The priority topic is completion of work on the drafting of an agreement abolishing medium- and shorter- range missiles. Besides that, said the Foreign Ministry spokesman, attention will be given to issues of reducing offensive armaments and maintaining the mode of the ABM Treaty, that is on antiballistic missiles. The discussion will also cover a range of the main issues of the relations between the two biggest powers, the USSR and the United States.

This morning there was another round of talks between Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, and U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz. Talks will continue after George Shultz ends his meeting with Mikhail Gorbachev. In the afternoon, George Shultz and Eduard Shevardnadze will each hold news conferences.

Gorbachev Trip 'Possible'

LD231040 Moscow TASS in English 1039 GMT 23 Oct 87

[Text] Moscow October 23 TASS—A TASS diplomatic correspondent writes:

At the beginning of a meeting in the Kremlin today between General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev and U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz, a group of journalists had an opportunity for a brief exchange with its participants.

Mikhail Gorbachev said he regarded his trip to the United States for a summit meeting with President of the United States Ronald Reagan possible. He said, however, that it would, most probably, be a short visit.

Further Shultz, Shevardnadze Talks

PM231337 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 23 Oct 87 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report under the general heading "Visit of the U.S. Secretary of State"]

[Text] On October 22 talks opened between E.A. Shevardnadze, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR foreign minister, and G. Shultz. The sides are focusing on issues related to the problems of reducing and liquidating nuclear arms, strengthening the ABM Treaty, and other issues pertaining to the area of security.

During the course of today's discussion, which was conducted in a businesslike and constructive spirit, the results of the work that has been done so far by the delegation of the USSR and United States at the Geneva talks on nuclear and space weapons were summed up; particular attention was given to preparing the text of a treaty on the elimination of Soviet and U.S. medium-range and shorter range missiles in the light of the accord in principle attained in this area during the meeting between the USSR foreign minister and the U.S. Secretary of State this September in Washington. In particular, the issues which the delegations have failed to harmonize completely in Geneva were examined in detail. The sides also paid great attention to other steps in the sphere of arms limitation and reduction. In this connection it was stated that progress in the matter of working out an agreement on a 50% reduction of strategic offensive arms could impart a new impulse to the talks across the entire series of the problems of disarmament.

The Soviet side stated that progress in this direction and, moreover, in the nearest future, is possible on the basis of mutual adherence to the principle of equality and identical security, which indisputably presupposes strict observation of the ABM Treaty.

The U.S. side made reservations, evidencing the persistent striving to place the plans for creating [sozdaniye] space arms in the United States outside the framework of the agreement. At the same time, there is understanding about the intensification of work on agreements on strategic offensive weapons and space which would be acceptable to the two sides.

The talks between Eduard Amvrosiyevich Shevardnadze and George Shultz were mainly conducted with a limited number of participants: On the Soviet side—Dobrynin, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and Besmertnykh, USSR deputy foreign minister; and on the U.S. side—Carlucci, and Ridgway, assistant secretary of state.

A plenary session was also conducted in which other officials took part: on the Soviet side—Vorontsov; Dubinin; Karpov, chief of the Department for Problems of Arms Control and Disarmament of the USSR Foreign Ministry; Stepanov, assistant to the USSR foreign minister; Tarasenko, chief of the general secretariat of the USSR Foreign Ministry; Sukhodrev, deputy chief of the United States of America and Canada Department; and on the U.S. side—Matlock; Nitze and Rowney, special advisers to the U.S. President and U.S. secretary of state on the Geneva talks; Ridgway and Holmes, U.S. assistant secretaries of state; Adelman, director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; and Kampelman, head of the U.S. delegation at the talks on nuclear and space arms in Geneva.

The ministers formed joint groups of experts which were instructed to discuss and complete the technical aspects of problems which are the subject of the Moscow talks. The talks will be continued.

Eduard Amvrosiyevich Shevardnadze hosted a luncheon in honor of George Shultz and his party. Yazov, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR defense minister; Dobrynin, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee; Kamentsev, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers; leaders of a number of USSR Ministries and departments; participants in the talks on the Soviet and U.S. sides; and other officials attended the luncheon.

On the same day a briefing devoted to the first day of the talks between E.A. Shevardnadze and G. Shultz was held at the USSR Foreign Ministry Press Center. Speaking at the briefing, C. Redman, official spokesman of the U.S. State Department, noted that the USSR foreign minister and the U.S. secretary of state were unanimous in the view that today's meeting took place in a businesslike, constructive atmosphere and that considerable [dostatochnyy] progress had been achieved at the talks.

G.I. Gerasimov, chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry Press Department, agreed with this assessment and emphasized that the Soviet side is in an optimistic mood and sees the main task in completing the work on the preparation of the treaty on the elimination of medium-range and operational-tactical missiles and achieving substantial progress on questions of reducing offensive arms and maintaining the provisions of the ABM Treaty.

Discussions With Gorbachev

LD231826 Moscow TASS in English 1812 GMT 23 Oct 87

[Text] Moscow October 23 TASS—On October 23, Mikhail Gorbachev received in the Kremlin U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz and the persons accompanying him. The conversation covered the most important

aspects of Soviet-American relations and international politics. The results of the talks held yesterday between Eduard Shevardnadze and George Shultz were examined in that context.

Welcoming the guests, Mikhail Gorbachev pointed out the positive significance of the regular character of the contacts and talks between representatives of the governments of both countries. A dynamization of political relations is taking place. The negotiating process is proceeding faster than ever before. And looking back at the whole path traversed from Geneva via Reykjavik to this day it can be said that quite a lot has been done.

Both sides specially noted the significance of Reykjavik, which was a real breakthrough ensuring the line of ascent in the development of Soviet-American dialogue and making it possible to reach the present level of examination of issues. An experience of doing business has been accumulated. The Soviet leadership highly appreciates the contacts with the U.S. President, the systematic meetings between the USSR foreign minister and the U.S. secretary of state. This was not the case during the first years of the current administration.

And now the groundwork has been laid for a search for decisions, an atmosphere of businesslike cooperation has taken shape. It is proceeding with difficulty, not without aggravations, but is proceeding.

Now both sides are aware of the need for placing the talks onto the plane of practical decisions. Specific steps towards each other are also being made. All this has given rise to great hopes in both our countries and the world over, and now specific and big results are expected from the USSR and the USA.

The sides discussed in detail the state of things in preparation for an agreement on medium-range and shorter-range missiles, and expressed mutual confidence of the possibility to conclude it already this year.

In this connection Mikhail Gorbachev stressed that of particularly great significance at the last stage of preparations is elaboration of issues pertaining to stringent control, which is also important for a perspective, bearing in mind the accumulation of experience for subsequently drawing up an agreement on strategic arms. [Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1800 GMT on 23 October carries as part of its regularly-scheduled "Vremya" newscast an announcer-read report on the Gorbachev-Shultz meeting. The television version at this point replaces "pertaining to stringent control, which is also important for a perspective, bearing..." with "pertaining to stringent verification [kontrol], which is also important in the long term, bearing..."] This should be done in such a way that both us and the Americans could be confident of the reliability of observance of the agreements.

To confirm what has been achieved on the issue of the elimination of medium-range and shorter-range missiles Mikhail Gorbachev proposed that from November 1 a moratorium be announced on all work in connection with their production, testing and deployment. The whole world would see that before its legal sealing the agreement already works, demonstrating the degree of consent on that issue.

Yet, he pointed out, the world expects more from the third Soviet-American summit meeting, hoping that the first agreement on nuclear weapons will usher in an even deeper and more substantive process of eliminating the universal nuclear danger. It is from these positions that the Soviet leadership approaches the evaluation of significance of the forthcoming meeting with the U.S. President.

The conversation centered on the issue of strategic offensive weapons. Both sides consider it to be of key significance in an effort to put an end to the nuclear weapons race and for Soviet-American relations.

The secretary of state emphasized that to discuss the issue was the principle aim of his visit to Moscow.

Since the question of reducing strategic arms is closely connected with the problem of non-orbiting weapons, Mikhail Gorbachev came forward with additional specific proposals with a view to finding solutions which would satisfy both sides. The essence of the proposals is as follows: the United States would agree legally to record an obligation not to use the right to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for ten years with strict compliance with the treaty. The Soviet Union would agree to setting limits to the number of warheads on individual types of strategic offensive arms of the Soviet Union and the United States. In so doing the USSR is prepared to agree—within the framework of an aggregate level of 6,000 warheads on the strategic offensive arms of the sides—to the deployment of not more than 3,000-3,300 warheads on intercontinental ballistic missiles, of not more than 1,800-2,000 warheads on the submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and of not more than 800-900 warheads on air-launched cruise missiles.

With the aims of strengthening the atmosphere of trust and discouraging any talks that the Soviet Union allegedly violates the ABM Treaty through the construction of the Krasnoyarsk radar, Mikhail Gorbachev told Mr Shultz that the Soviet Union would unilaterally introduce a one-year moratorium on all work which had been done there. "Naturally, we expect a similar step with regard to the U.S. radar in Scotland", he said.

Taking these new compromise initiatives into account, Mikhail Gorbachev suggested, without losing time, that the work to coordinate positions in the field of strategic offensive arms and space at the talks in Geneva and at other levels be intensified so that, at a meeting, which is being planned for this year, with the President of the

United States, it would be possible, along with the signing of a treaty on medium- and shorter-range missiles, to record an accord on the key provisions of future agreements on strategic offensive arms and space, which in their turn, could be signed during Ronald Reagan's reply visit to the Soviet Union.

So, an extensive agenda for a summit meeting in Washington would be taking shape in the spirit of the understanding reached during George Shultz's previous visit to Moscow in April this year.

"I hope", Mikhail Gorbachev said, "that one and a half month are enough to work out and duly to prepare all this. I am ready to visit the United States. But so far I am put on my guard by possible results".

The question of the situation in the Persian Gulf was touched upon during the meeting. Referring to Resolution 598 which had been unanimously adopted by the United Nations Security Council, Mikhail Gorbachev drew attention to the fact that the resolution had been also the result of the Soviet-U.S. constructive cooperation on this very acute problem. However, following that, the United States decided to act like it did "in good days of old". "What emerged as a result of cooperation within the U.N. framework is now called in question. This gives rise to disappointment".

"The U.S. naval build up in the Gulf—contrary to Washington's declarations—has made the situation more complex, and not simplified it. The argument that that was necessary to ensure the supply of oil is understandable to us. But we do not understand the ways of action which lead precisely to the opposite result. The Persian Gulf issue is not an isolated one. If such a policy is carried on, it may bury much in the international process, including many things in Soviet-U.S. relations".

Mikhail Gorbachev expressed the hope that the American leadership would seriously consider all possible consequences of its policy in the Persian Gulf, and called for consistent implementation of a joint line in the spirit of Security Council Resolution 598.

Gorbachev also raised the issue of trust. The Soviet leadership, in keeping with principles and ideas of new thinking, is striving to use all opportunities for broadening mutual understanding among citizens in both countries, and encourages various forms of contacts between public representatives at all levels.

The American leadership, contrary to public declarations and assurances made officially, sticks to a course of kindling mistrust and suspicion, and cultivates the "enemy image" with regard to the Soviet Union.

The recent evidence is the publication of a document on "Soviet influence" activities in 1986-1987. It was drawn up by the Department of State jointly with the Pentagon, the CIA, USIA, the Department of Justice, military

intelligence, and so on, and represents a set of "cold war" stereotypes directed at preserving anti-Soviet sentiments and shaping a negative attitude among Americans towards the restructuring drive which is, allegedly, conceived in order to delude world public and lull its vigilance.

We are serious about changing relations with the United States for the better, are ready to go far in economic and cultural relations and in humanitarian matters. In our society there is no prejudice against the American people, it is open for mutual understanding and friendliness. It is high time that not only Soviet, but also American bulldozers be used to clear the way towards each other.

There is a need both for you and for us to ponder once again over the subject of discussions in Moscow during these two days, Gorbachev said. We are at a very crucial stage. Both sides need maximum attention and mutual understanding so as not to pass up a chance which we had once lost already.

The following officials took part in the meeting: E. A. Shevardnadze, A. F. Dobrynin, S. F. Akhromeyev, A. A. Bessmerthykh, ambassador Yu. V. Dubinin, Frank Carlucci, Rozanne Ridgway, Paul Nitze and Ambassador Jack Matlock.

Conclusion of Talks

LD232132 Moscow TASS in English 2120 GMT 23 Oct 87

["Soviet-American Talks Over"--TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow October 23 TASS—The talks between Eduard Shevardnadze, member of the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee, USSR foreign minister, and U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz were continued in the evening of October 22 and in the afternoon on October 23.

Basing themselves on the understandings in principle reached in the course of the meeting with Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, the sides held a business-like and useful discussion of the most topical security issues. The elaboration of the basic provisions of the agreement on the medium-range and shorter-range missiles has been actually completed. The delegations of the USSR and the USA have been instructed to complete within the shortest time work on the text of the treaty on the elimination of the above-said missiles.

Much attention was devoted to the perspective of bringing closer the stands of the sides on the 50 per cent cut in the strategic offensive weapons under the conditions of strict observance of the ABM Treaty. The fresh Soviet initiatives on those issues set forth by Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee,

to U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz ensure, provided there is preparedness on both sides to seek an agreement, the basis for progress in that field.

In pursuit of the understanding reached in Washington on full-scale stage-by-stage Soviet-American talks on nuclear tests the sides agreed that they will be started in Geneva on November 9.

The state of things with the drawing up of a mandate for talks between the Warsaw Treaty states and the NATO treaty countries on force and conventional weapons cuts in Europe has been comprehensively examined and problems pertaining to a total ban on chemical weapons have been analysed.

In the course of an exchange of views on the regional problems special emphasis was laid on questions in connection with the dangerous situation emerging in the Persian Gulf as a result of the concentration of the U.S. force there and also in connection with the settlement of the Iran-Iraq conflict.

Some questions pertaining to bilateral Soviet-American relations have been discussed in detail.

Humanitarian issues, in which there is mutual interest, were touched upon in the course of the talks.

In conclusion of the talks Eduard Shevardnadze and George Shultz heard reports and summed up the results of the work by the joint groups of experts on a broad range of issues under discussion.

SDI Seen as 'Obstacle'

LD250447 Moscow in English to North America 2300 GMT 24 Oct 87

[Text] Pavel Kuznetsov comments on the Soviet-American talks in Moscow.

[Kuznetsov] According to the weathermen, we haven't had that much fog around Moscow for over a century. Unable to fly in here U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz arrived in the Soviet capital on Thursday by train. He and his team of about 100 experts and officials had a very busy schedule, conferring with their Soviet counterparts. On Friday George Shultz had a 4 and 1/2 hour meeting with Mikhail Gorbachev.

By the end of Friday, the first disturbing signals that something must have gone wrong began to pour in. The discussions were prolonged and the announced news conferences were delayed. So, as some of the fog began to drift away, we've learned that the two sides have failed to set a date for a Soviet-American summit despite the heartening news that an INF accord on the elimination of medium- and shorter-range nuclear missiles was virtually completed. Standing in the way of a summit, and consequently further progress in arms control, is the Reagan administration's SDI, or the Star Wars program.

To be more precise, Washington's unwillingness to demonstrate flexibility on this issue and its resolve to go ahead with the development, construction, and testing in space of all kinds of esoteric technology and new devices in violation of the Soviet-American ABM Treaty of 1972.

Judging by the first reactions from Washington, Moscow is said to have deliberately raised an obstacle to a summit by linking such a meeting with progress on the SDI issue. According to the White House spokesman, Marlin Fitzwater, the issue seems to be whether or not Gorbachev wants to come to the United States for a summit. Well, Mr Fitzwater should know better than simplify matters to such an extent. During the weeks leading to the Moscow talks there were more than enough signals in the Soviet press and electronic media and in official statements that another summit should not deal exclusively with the signing of an INF treaty but should also focus on provisions of a treaty on strategic offensive arms and antimissile systems. Didn't Mikhail Gorbachev himself, in one of his recent speeches, allude to the possibility of there being 50% cuts in long range nuclear missiles in the first half of next year if both sides pledged to strengthen the ABM Treaty?

All these signals were based on an understanding reached during the April and September meetings between Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and Secretary Shultz. In turn this understanding was achieved during the Reykjavik summit in Iceland, where SDI got in the way and derailed hopes for a historic chance to get rid of all strategic offensive arms within a decade. An INF accord would be too limited an agenda for the Soviet and American leaders if at the same time there is no progress on SDI.

As far as strategic offensive arms are concerned, last Friday Mikhail Gorbachev proposed ceilings on warheads in each leg of the two nation's strategic triad. The numbers are very close to those that the United States Administration has been in favor of so we are very close on medium- and shorter-range missiles; we are very close on how to proceed with 50% cuts in long-range missiles; but we are very apart on SDI and the ABM Treaty.

In my view this really sad turn of events in Moscow should not make us overly pessimistic. After all, many thousands of passengers stranded in Moscow's four airports at one moment lost all hope that this dense fog would ever move away, so let's hope that in the weeks to come the skies will become clearer over the SDI issue.

Reagan Stands by SDI

LD232147 Moscow TASS in English 2144 GMT 23 Oct 87

[Text] Washington October 23 TASS—President Reagan met with West European journalists today and answered their questions about the results of the talks held by U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz in Moscow.

The President pointed out that "some progress was made" on the way to the conclusion of an agreement on medium- and shorter-range missiles, and voiced hope that his meeting in the United States with General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev would take place later this year.

Describing the current atmosphere in Soviet-American relations, Mr Reagan stated: "I have to believe that there is an effort being made on their part as well as ours to make the cold war a little warmer in the right way. Let's say, a little less cold, but also a little less war".

In answer to the question whether he is prepared to make an adjustment in his position with regard to the U.S. "Strategic Defence Initiative" which is commonly known as the "Star Wars" programme in order to remove the obstacle to progress at the talks on strategic arms, the President of the United States said: "No".

Shultz News Conference

LD232326 Moscow Television Service in Russian 2035 GMT 23 Oct 87

[Special report on 23 October news conference held by U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz in the Press Center of the USSR Foreign Ministry in Moscow—with recorded passages—Shultz speaks in English with superimposed Russian translation; all questioners unidentified; questions either in Russian or English with superimposed Russian translation]

[Text] [Announcer] Press conferences were held by U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz, and Eduard Amvrosiyevich Shevardnadze, USSR minister of foreign affairs, in the Press Center of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Moscow today. Addressing the press conference, George Shultz said:

[Shultz] We came to Moscow to discuss the whole range of issues that are of interest to us and the Soviet Union; and we are fully determined to achieve maximum progress in all spheres. We have had quite exhaustive and careful discussions on practically all the issues. The general spirit of the discussion was constructive. There was a useful exchange of views on bilateral relations. We also considered regional matters. We worked on all aspects of disarmament and, of course, on matters connected with the talks on nuclear arms in space.

We achieved progress in the area of medium-range missiles. I believe that both sides agree that we have almost reached an agreement here. Details remain concerning verification and inspection.

In our opinion additional time is needed to satisfy ourselves (that what is possible has been done) [v tom, chto sdelano vozmozhno] in the verification area. Certain new proposals were put forward in the sphere of strategic armaments. We studied matters related to the ABM Treaty. It is not yet clear on which of them we can

reach agreement. The belief in the United States is that we must do everything possible to clarify how we are to defend ourselves against ballistic missiles and insure the security of our friends and allies.

Today I again had the honor of meeting General Secretary Gorbachev. It transpired that Mr Gorbachev is not yet satisfied with the situation in the spheres of space and defense.

We were unable to set any specific date for General Secretary Gorbachev's visit to Washington. However, he persuaded us that he would like to visit the United States and does not exclude the possibility of doing so before this year ends.

[Announcer] George Shultz then answered questions from journalists.

[Question] Can all the difficulties be reduced to the U.S. position on SDI?

[Shultz] The record of the administration and that of the United States in general, consists in the fact that we are resolutely defending U.S. security. How can we defend ourselves against ballistic missiles? This question, naturally, is of an enormous concern to all of us; and it is precisely here that the initial basis of our position lies. At the same time, from the very start the President has shown and continues to show readiness to extensively reduce nuclear arsenals. If we conclude an agreement on medium-range missiles, if we sign and ratify it, this will be an important step. Yet it would be considerably more important if we could go further and achieve a 50% reduction in strategic arms.

[Question] Has the Soviet side made the same reservations it made in Reykjavik or have some new points been brought forward which you have been unable to answer satisfactorily?

[Shultz] Considerable progress—I would say enormous progress—was made in Reykjavik, and not only in the area of arms control but in other areas too. For example, it was precisely in Reykjavik that we first established clearly and in a well-defined way the practice of conferences of regular working groups on human rights. Therefore, I think if one refers to Reykjavik, one could say that we achieved more in Reykjavik than at any of the preceding meetings. After Reykjavik, certain changes occurred in the positions on the issues of ABM's and space, yet I think it would be fair to say that we have more differences on this issue than on medium-range missiles and strategic arms.

[Question] Did you discuss with USSR leaders the Arab Gulf issue or some kind of cooperation between the United States and the USSR in this area?

[Announcer] Answering this question, George Shultz noted that in conversations in Moscow the situation in the Persian Gulf region and the Iran-Iraq conflict were discussed fairly fully. In this connection, he stressed the importance of the efforts by the UN secretary general for implementation of Security Council Resolution 598. Both the Soviet Union and the United States, Shultz said, want the Security Council and the UN to be effective bodies. The time will come, I hope, when we will be able to work together more fruitfully.

[Question] Do you think that an additional meeting between you and Mr Shevardnadze would be necessary to prepare a summit?

[Shultz] This remains to be resolved. The meetings that Mr Shevardnadze and myself have already had have been productive, but I do not think that a meeting could be held right now on any specific issue. A certain amount of progress has been made and we intend to carry on with this work. When it seems useful to hold meetings between ministers of foreign affairs or other officials, we are prepared to hold them.

[Announcer] The US secretary of state said in conclusion: We had a discussion and talked about our priorities. I have the impression that we will be able to get results. In other words, perhaps our goals are not very different. True, I am not very convinced that this is true of space defense. The United States will now be waiting for the letter that Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev intends to send to President Reagan.

Shevardnadze Conference

LD240003 Moscow Television Service in Russian 2045 GMT 23 Oct 87

[Report on 23 October news conference given by Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze in the Press Center of the USSR Foreign Ministry in Moscow]

[Text] [Announcer] A news conference addressed by Eduard Amvrosyevich Shevardnadze was held today:

[Begin recording] [Shevardnadze] How did the Moscow meeting go? I want to stress that it was a useful meeting and, overall, one that brought results. I do not yet have any information about how the secretary of state described our talks, the talks with the Soviet leadership, but on this I do not think we should disagree. Why were this meeting and the discussions in Moscow productive? The first thing I would draw your attention to is the fact that we managed to overcome some very serious obstacles that arose in Geneva at the Soviet-U.S. talks on medium-range and operational-tactical missiles.

First, we finally formulated the provisions concerning the Pershing-1A's, and this is of great importance. I want to stress again that this problem really is a fine and delicate one. I want to note straight away the positive role played in solving this question by our allies, the

GDR, CSSR, and of course by the leadership of the FRG. We have agreed on a final formula on the Pershing-1's at the Moscow talks. The time frame for eliminating the medium-range and shorter-range missiles and the procedures for their destruction have been agreed on at the talks here in Moscow. We have reached agreement on the exchange of data on this class of missiles, on both the one and two, and this is of fundamental importance for all subsequent decisions. To a considerable extent, we have moved forward on the final stage of questions relating to the verification and inspection.

It is precisely these problems that were moved into the forefront. I must say that on many of the main questions we found mutually acceptable solutions, although because of a time shortage we were not able to discuss here in Moscow all the questions relating to verification and inspection. I stress that this was because of a time shortage, although we had a directive—and I mean our delegation did—from Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev that all main issues connected with eliminating these types of nuclear armaments were to be agreed on here in Moscow. But I will say, and I think that the comrades can confirm this, that all basic problems involving eliminating these armaments have been resolved in principle.

As I am aware, and we discussed this at the last final session with the secretary of state and other members of the U.S. delegation, they are in agreement with this. So the question of concluding an agreement on eliminating medium-range and operational-tactical missiles no longer—I can say boldly—evokes doubts. Such an agreement will be drafted. That is one side of the issue, a very important and fundamental one.

If it were not for the Moscow meeting—and I must say this even though I have great respect for our specialists, experts, and negotiators working in Geneva—the debates would still be continuing, whereas the Moscow meeting has facilitated the conclusion and acceleration of this important process. The talks were also useful in beginning, or rather setting a date for beginning, wide-ranging talks on nuclear tests. This we have conclusively determined. This is the problem that has been disturbing many representatives of the world community. As we agreed on in Washington and as the Soviet leadership had decided, the central problem in our talks was the problem of a 50% reduction in strategic offensive weapons and the problems linked to preserving the ABM Treaty and reinforcing it.

I would like to tell you that, on the issue of reducing strategic offensive weapons, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev has introduced a fundamentally important new proposal on determining the quantitative levels regarding the strategic triad—intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and air-launched cruise missiles on strategic bombers. I would like to make public these figures which were given at the talks. Comrade Gorbachev proposed setting a ceiling for

intercontinental ballistic missiles. This is 3 300 warheads—from 3,000 to 3,300. For submarine-launched ballistic missiles, from 1,800 to 2,000 [unidentified voice interjects: "warheads"] I am referring to nuclear warheads. It is a good thing there are specialists sitting beside me! And not always getting in the way! [laughter] On air-launched cruise missiles, from 800 to 900. Those who know about the subject and are following the Soviet-U.S. talks will agree that these figures are very close to those spelled out many times by representatives of the U.S. Administration.

I think that we have taken a very major step along the path toward achieving an agreement on the fundamental problem in the Soviet-U.S. talks: a sharp reduction in strategic offensive weapons. You know what our position is on the ABM Treaty. I would like to inform you that we have, on numerous occasions, set forth our position that the ABM Treaty must be preserved in the form in which it was signed and ratified, and that there should be no withdrawal from the treaty for a minimum of 10 years. We said this in Reykjavik, and we said it at all the subsequent meetings. I do not think it will be an exaggeration to say that the absolute majority of countries, including the allies of the United States, share the opinion that the ABM Treaty must be preserved.

After Reykjavik, we attempted to make a few clarifications regarding the development of our position, and frankly, we went halfway to meet the Americans. First of all, we said, and we now confirm, that we allow research work, and not only research work, but also the building of the corresponding mockups and models under laboratory conditions, test sites, under production conditions, and so forth. We went further: At the latest talks, and particularly at the talks in Washington, we suggested to the U.S. Administration that a list be drawn up of the devices whose delivery into space would be banned. We went even further: At the talks, we correspondingly provided the parameters and characteristics of these devices. Everything relating to the development [sozdaniye] of any instruments and devices below those parameters would not be banned.

I emphasize that this premise is of fundamental significance for achieving an agreement on adherence to the ABM Treaty during the agreed upon period. Unfortunately, I have to say that in Moscow the U.S. delegation did not display a willingness to discuss matters relating to preserving the ABM Treaty on a businesslike and constructive basis. We were unsuccessful in that discussion. We consider these two aspects, which are constantly present at Soviet-U.S. talks—a 50% reduction of strategic offensive arms and the preservation of the ABM Treaty—to be of fundamental significance for Soviet-U.S. relations.

As far back as Washington, we came to an agreement that the next major stage in Soviet-U.S. relations would be a meeting between Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, general secretary of the party Central Committee, and

President Reagan, before the end of this year, in the autumn of this year. We also had a fundamental discussion there about a rough program of further high level contacts. In addition, we agreed there that an agreement on medium-range missiles would be signed at the present meeting. The agreement would be prepared in advance, and the leaders of the two states would be able to concentrate their main attention at this meeting around the problem of strategic...[corrects himself] reducing strategic offensive arms, and the ABM Treaty.

The next stage in high-level Soviet-U.S. contacts is a visit by the President of the United States of America in the first half of next year, taking into consideration the fact that at the first summit meeting an accord in principle will be reached, while in Moscow the agreement on strategic offensive arms and the ABM Treaty will be signed. That is how we envisaged, so to speak, the entire program of future contacts. I have to say that the U.S. side displayed an interest in such a program; we had a fundamental discussion about it, and we said that under such a scenario it would be possible, genuinely possible, to ratify both the first and the second treaty, since we attach great significance precisely to the problem of ratification.

Why am I telling you about all these nuances in such detail? Because we are ready to work—namely with the present administration—for major successes, a major breakthrough. I would say, on the most important directions for the elimination—the reduction and subsequently the elimination—of nuclear arsenals, and for keeping space peaceful. Unfortunately, at the Moscow talks it was not possible to make any headway in this decisive field.

I want to inform you that Comrade Gorbachev, general secretary of the party Central Committee, has confirmed his readiness to meet President Reagan, to sign a treaty on medium-range missiles and operational-tactical missiles and, in general, to determine the key clauses of an agreement to reduce strategic offensive arms and preserve the ABM Treaty. I want to emphasize that he has confirmed this readiness. He also told the secretary of state that the Soviet proposals on strategic offensive arms—the figures of which have been given—will probably require some time for detailed study by specialists as well as the U.S. Administration before a summit meeting. [end recording]

[Announcer] Comrade Shevardnadze then replied to correspondents' questions.

[Begin recording] [Fischer] Fischer, GDR Radio, Comrade Minister, what opportunities are there at the moment for the zero option on medium-range missiles. Specifically, when will it be possible to complete work on a treaty on medium-range missiles and operational-tactical missiles?

[Shevardnadze] You know, at the final session, when we drew up the results of the work that had been carried out, we even estimated dates. True, this is always risky, [chuckles] it is always risky to talk about dates, but I think that if the delegations make a big effort—and I have no doubt that the Soviet delegation is ready, so to speak, to act precisely on that level—in 2 to 3 weeks, maybe a little more or a little less, in principle it would be possible to prepare such a draft agreement, inasmuch as the main, so to speak, the cardinal problems have been resolved. There are experienced people sitting here who know that at the final stage what we sometimes consider to be technicalities become very difficult to overcome. But I think that by common efforts we will succeed in preparing such an agreement in a relatively short time.

[Boland in English with superimposed Russian translation] Celestine Boland from *The Washington Post*. I would like to know, if you were not able to achieve progress in the field of space and strategic offensive arms, do you mean that an agreement on medium-range missiles will not be signed this year? If the reply is no, does this mean that the package revealed by Gorbachev on the 26th has once again turned out to be tied up, that once again there is this linkage?

[Shevardnadze] If there is no agreement, if there is no agreement on the key clauses I have been talking about, or rather an accord on the key clauses, this does not signify that a treaty will not be signed on medium-range missiles and operational-tactical missiles. Where and when is another matter, but undoubtedly such a treaty will be signed. [end recording]

[Announcer] Replies were also given to other questions from correspondents. [video shows from left to right on rostrum: Karpov, Bessmertnykh, Shevardnadze, and Gerasimov]

Reagan on Shultz Talks

LD241938 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1808 GMT 24 Oct 87

[Text] Washington, 24 Oct (TASS)—Delivering a routine radio address on Saturday U.S. President Ronald Reagan touched in particular on the question of Soviet-U.S. relations. He pointed out that this week's Soviet-U.S. talks in Moscow touched on "all aspects of relations" between the USSR and the United States. "At present," the U.S. President stated, "we are nearer to completing work on an agreement to eliminate a whole class of U.S. and Soviet medium-range nuclear missiles, and progress was also achieved in other areas."

"The date for holding a summit was not determined, but we are in no hurry," Reagan continued. Moreover he asserted that the United States "will not sacrifice its fundamental interests." [Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 26 October First Edition on page 6 carries a similar report, here replacing "not sacrifice its fundamental interests" with "not sacrifice its important interests"]

merely for the sake of holding a meeting.""] As is well-known, the current Washington administration is persistently unwilling to renounce plans to create a wide-scale system of antimissile defense of which strike space weapons are to be a central element.

Shultz, Carlucci Depart

LD231910 Moscow TASS in English 1900 GMT 23 Oct 87

[Text] Moscow October 23 TASS—U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz and his wife left Moscow today.

He is being accompanied by Assistant to the President for National Security Frank Carlucci.

They were seen off at the airport by Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister Yuliy Vorontsov, Soviet Ambassador to the U.S. Yuriy Budinin and other officials.

The send-off party also included U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union Jack Matlock.

Shultz Reports to NATO

LD241709 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1556 GMT 24 Oct 87

[Text] Brussels, 24 Oct (TASS)—A special session of the North Atlantic Council at the level of foreign minister and ambassador-permanent representative was held today in the headquarters of the North Atlantic bloc. At it U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz, who had arrived here from Moscow, spoke of the outcome of his talks with Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and with USSR Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze.

Speaking at a press conference, the U.S. secretary of state said that a useful exchange of opinions took place at the session. The main outcome of the discussion at the Moscow talks, he noted, was "general determination to achieve an agreement on medium-range missiles."

The head of the U.S. foreign policy department said that the drafting of the main provisions of an accord on medium- and shorter-range missiles was more or less completed at the talks in Moscow. In the words of G. Shultz, the delegations of the United States and the USSR were instructed to report back each week to their respective ministries on the progress of the talks to conclude the drafting of the text of an agreement on the elimination of this type of missile.

Shultz expressed the hope that this work would be completed in the near future and that a treaty could be signed. "We should like it to be signed at the next Soviet-U.S. summit meeting," he added. "But if such a meeting does not take place, then the question of how this should best be done may be settled. The main thing is the essence of the agreement itself, that it be achieved."

Shultz acknowledged that it was not possible to make real progress in Moscow on the question of strategic offensive weapons. The U.S. secretary of state spoke out against the Soviet proposal to declare a moratorium on all work connected with the production, testing and deployment of medium-and shorter-range missiles. Shultz claims that if the sides did this, the "basis for future talks would be removed." It followed from his words that the United States is not ready either to declare a moratorium on all work being carried out on the U.S. radar installation in Scotland.

For his part NATO Secretary General Lord Carrington stressed in a statement that the members of the North Atlantic Council greeted "the continued significant progress in achieving a totally verifiable agreement on medium-range missiles. The successful completion of these talks will be an important achievement." In the words of Lord Carrington, the allies are very interested in "progress being made on all issues of East-West relations."

Meets With Journalists

LD251345 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0930 GMT 25 Oct 87

[Text] At the beginning of this issue of "Mayak" panorama we shall hear a report from our correspondent in Brussels, Kipras Mazheyka. A special session of the NATO council was held there at which U.S. Secretary of State Shultz spoke, informing the partners in the bloc of the results of his talks in Moscow. We go over to Brussels.

[Mazheyka] This special meeting of North Atlantic Treaty Organization members at the level of foreign ministers of the bloc's member-countries lasted for 2 and 1/2 hours. That was unusually long. Therefore, the expected meeting of journalists with George Shultz, who had arrived straight from Moscow, was postponed. It is not just a question of statistics, but if we are to believe the words of the U.S. secretary of state himself, then the session that just ended is already the 56th since the Soviet-U.S. negotiations on reductions in the nuclear weapons arsenals started. How does the present session of NATO members differ from all the others? I think first and foremost in its cautious optimism. The high-ranking visitor from Washington told journalists that by the end of next week the heads of the Soviet and U.S. delegations at the Geneva talks on medium- and shorter-range missiles should agree on the final text of the

relevant agreements. He stated that noticeable progress had been made both in working out a schedule for the stage-by-stage elimination of this class of weapon, as well as in the sphere of verifying the strict observance of the accords reached.

Alongside the progress that has been achieved, the head of U.S. diplomacy noted the deep-going differences that still exist in the positions of both sides regarding a moratorium on this type of missile, and especially the problem with SDI. During the news conference in Evere George Shultz touched upon the recent meeting with Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev. He described the Soviet leader as an exceptionally competent and business-like interlocutor who makes an indelible impression with his knowledge of the problems and manner of contact with people.

Moscow Talks Discussed

LD260642 Moscow TASS in English 0632 GMT 26 Oct 87

[Text] Washington October 26 TASS—U.S. President Ronald Reagan met on Sunday with Secretary of State George Shultz and Assistant to the President for National Security Frank Carlucci who returned from a trip to the Soviet Union.

According to a White House spokesman, they discussed the results of the Soviet-American talks in Moscow last week.

INF Treaty 'Within Reach'

LD260938 Moscow TASS in English 0715 GMT 26 Oct 87

[Text] Washington October 26 TASS—Frank Carlucci, Assistant to the U.S. President for National Security Affairs, appeared in ABC's "This Week With David Brinkley" program on Sunday. In answer to the question about prospects for final elaboration of a Soviet-U.S. agreement on medium- and shorter-range missiles Mr Carlucci gave on the whole an optimistic appraisal.

"I think it's quite clear that an INF treaty is well within reach, I would say", he said, "we are just now wrapping up the details. We've made good progress in Moscow on that treaty".

Having recalled that other aspects of Soviet-American relations were also touched upon in Moscow, Mr Carlucci mentioned "a thorough discussion of regional issues, although there are a lot of differences there".

"So it was, by and large, a productive meeting", he said.

At the same time it was clear from pronouncements by the Assistant to the U.S. President for National Security Affairs that the Reagan administration did not intend to abandon the "Star Wars" program which is aimed at developing space strike weapons and at militarizing outer space on a large scale.

He stated that President Reagan was determined to proceed with this program.

The "Star Wars" program, which is aimed at bringing into being a large-scale anti-missile defence system with space-based elements, enters into direct conflict with the Soviet-U.S. ABM Treaty which is the cornerstone of the arms control process.

U.S. 'Disappointment' Noted

PM261141 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 26 Oct 87 Second Edition p 6

[Own correspondent V. Gan report: "Reaction on the Potomac"]

[Text] Washington, 25 Oct—The mood here after the Soviet-U.S. talks in Moscow may be characterized chiefly by the word "disappointment." Of all the comments being made at the present moment on the Potomac, that is the word used most often. Disappointment is being noted in the White House, by "senior officials" in the administration, and in Congress.

The explanation is not hard to find. At a press conference last Thursday the President encouraged the country to expect "cardinal improvements" in Soviet-U.S. relations. "The White House gave us every grounds for believing that at the press conference in Moscow Secretary of State Shultz would announce the achievement of an arms control agreement and a summit meeting. He did neither of those things," ABC TV stated.

Some U.S. political observers, like a number of U.S. congressmen, are trying to view the course of events without prejudice. "The President's 'Star Wars' program and the U.S. side's lack of flexibility on this question are what caused Gorbachev's refusal to set a firm date for the meeting with Reagan," ABC TV believes. CBS, in turn, notes that "the lack of progress in limiting the strategic defense initiative prevented" the fixing of a date.

Senator P. Leahy from Vermont, a prominent figure in the Democratic Party, expressed the same idea in these terms: "If Reagan wants to achieve the control and reduction of strategic nuclear arms, he must at least begin talks on the 'star wars' question."

These are the first reactions to date. In the future, no doubt, people here will also analyze the progress achieved at the talks on questions of preparing an agreement on medium-range and operational-tactical missiles and will address the USSR's important new compromise proposals which enable a solution to be found on the crucial problem of the 50% reduction of strategic offensive weapons while strictly observing the ABM Treaty.

/8309

CSO: 52001003

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

AUSTRIA: MOCK, JANKOWITSCH WELCOME INF AGREEMENT

52002412 Vienna WIENER ZEITUNG in German 23 Sep 87 p 3

[Text] In a statement issued on Tuesday (22 September) Vice Chancellor and Foreign Minister Mock welcomed the agreement concerning intermediate-range nuclear weapons concluded by the superpowers in Washington. Former Foreign Minister Peter Jankowitsch also voiced positive feelings yesterday.

The process of the international disarmament debate, said Mock, has gained new stimuli from the talks of the two foreign ministers of the Soviet Union and the United States on an agreement in the field of intermediate-range nuclear arms.

Austria welcomes the agreement reached in Washington and hopes that the detailed negotiations will be concluded soon, thus leading to the total elimination of this kind of weapons. The worldwide elimination of Soviet and U.S. intermediate-range weapons with a range of over 500 km would not only lead to a first real reduction of the two superpowers' armament arsenals, but could also introduce a new era of greater mutual trust in their relations, Mock said.

In addition, Austria notes with satisfaction the intention of the superpowers to start talks about a nuclear test stop before the end of the year, Mock stated. The Austrian Government most recently expressed the importance it accords to a fast agreement on a comprehensive nuclear test stop in its public appeal of 3 February 1987 to the Soviet Union and the United States, Mock concluded.

The forthcoming Soviet-U.S. agreement on the elimination of the so-called "Euromissiles"—the intermediate-range and short-range missiles deployed in the areas of NATO and Warsaw Pact—is a special challenge for Europe, said Peter Jankowitsch, chairman of the Foreign Policy Committee of the Austrian Nationalrat, on Tuesday at a trilateral seminar organized by the Austrian Institute for International Relations in Laxenburg, which is attended by security experts from Austria, Hungary, and Yugoslavia.

The forthcoming elimination of these kinds of missiles is a great gain for Europe's security, Jankowitsch noted.

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

ITALY'S ANDREOTTI REPORTS TO FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

52002409a Rome ANSA in English 1246 GMT 30 Sep 87

[Excerpts] Rome, 30 Sep (ANSA)--The recent tentative accord between Washington and Moscow to eliminate short- and medium-range missiles in Europe and the crisis in the Persian Gulf were at the center of a report Italian Foreign Minister Giulio Andreotti made to the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee here today.

On the U.S.-Soviet "Euromissiles" accord, Andreotti affirmed that this agreement "is of great importance for Europeans not only because it lifts the nuclear threat against the continent, but also because it is the result of close consultations between the United States and its European allies".

The foreign minister went on to underline that this accord was able to take form also thanks to "Italy's initial and firm support for the "zero-option" proposal within the framework of the NATO alliance".

After reassuring the Foreign Affairs Committee that the elimination of Euromissiles in "no way represented a reduction in Washington's willingness to defend Europe", Andreotti did point out that the accord "eliminated certain concerns but in turn raised others".

"The accord on Euromissiles" the foreign minister said, represents a starting point of a process that must extend towards strategic balances and space defence. The accord is but the tip of an iceberg, below it are other accords that are destined to surface, little by little, and one can already see their outlines".

/9274

ITALIAN PC'S NAPOLITANO ON EUROPEAN DEFENSE

52002409b Rome L'ESPRESSO in Italian 4 Oct 87 pp 60-61

[Interview with PCI International Relations Commission chief Giorgio Napolitano by Gianni Corbi in Oslo; date not given]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] [Corbi] Following the Washington Euromissiles accord many people have commented that in a few months' time Europe will be naked and powerless in the face of a Soviet Union—with or without Gorbachev—that enjoys an overwhelming superiority in conventional weapons. Even *Le Monde* has written that "unless the Europeans wake up quickly they are in danger of seeming little more than midgets isolated from the two superpowers." Are these criticisms exaggerated?

[Napolitano] It is ridiculous, in the presence of an accord of such importance, to continue talking in terms of a deterioration of the situation or of a Western Europe more exposed than before to threats from the East. Even Britain's Conservative foreign secretary, Howe, has talked about "gross exaggerations" and "utter nonsense." For years the objective of dismantling the Soviet missiles was described as highly desirable with a view to eliminating a factor that tipped the balance in the Warsaw Pact's favor, but now that the accord has been reached people are sounding the alarm.

[Corbi] Nevertheless many experts are urging great caution and the signing of the treaty after a period of reflection to spare Europe a situation of vulnerability and imbalance.

[Napolitano] The Euromissiles will not be dismantled in a day or a month. It will take some years to fully implement the accord. I note that it was the United States that pressed for a more rapid implementation. Having said that, I too believe there is a great and pressing need to resume negotiations between the two blocs for a real accord on the reduction and balance of conventional weapons.

[Corbi] NATO military officials are urging individual member states to increase defense spending to counter-balance the Warsaw Pact's superiority in conventional weapons. Some are talking about 5 percent, some even 7

percent a year in real terms. Does the PCI agree with this need? Do you believe a burning argument could resume within the party on this subject?

[Napolitano] What is the point of talking now about increases in military spending when we do not know whether, and if so when, accords will be reached on the restructuring and reduction of conventional weapons at a level acceptable to the Atlantic Alliance? Here in Oslo also, there has been much talk about the Warsaw Pact's superiority in certain kinds of weapons. However, this is a field where there are considerable differences of calculation even within the western camp and where the qualitative factor is of fundamental importance. Nevertheless it is certainly true that Europe will have to shoulder a greater share of responsibility—including financial responsibility—within NATO. We have discussed all this within the PCI, proceeding from the guidelines on European security matters established in November 1986.

[Corbi] This really does not seem to be the case, at least judging from reports of the debate within the PCI. From a distance, the PCI's foreign policy seems more like an archipelago composed of a multitude of islands and islets—study centers, departments, and peace committees in which everyone tries to assert his own viewpoints. Furthermore there are very prominent leaders such as Pietro Ingrao who organize conferences at which it is argued that "the nuclear issue cannot be confined within the parliamentary forums but must be brought to the masses."

[Napolitano] The fact is that advocates of Italy's exit from NATO have ultimately proved to be in a small minority. I am not saying there is no confusion and uncertainty on these topics in some sectors of the party but I confirm that the PCI leadership group is determined to pursue a policy that has shown in recent weeks, with the Euromissiles accord, that it is possible to make the policy of disarmament and detente prevail within NATO.

[Corbi] In Bavaria 20,000 French troops and 50,000 Germans are taking part in large-scale maneuvers whose theme is defense against an attack from the East. According to some people these joint maneuvers represent the first step toward a multilateral European military force. Would the PCI be in favor if Italy were asked to participate in such a joint force?

[Napolitano] At the time we were in favor of the Spinelli plan, which envisaged EC cooperation in the security field and subsequently in defense. Then nothing more was done about it—certainly not through any fault of ours. However, it is entirely premature to talk in terms of joint centers or even commands. The Franco-German joint maneuvers have been widely publicized but a more autonomous and concrete European defense strategy should go well beyond the Franco-German context, partly to prevent it from becoming a disruptive or exclusive axis. [passage omitted]

PRC: PEOPLE'S DAILY ON INF AGREEMENT

52004001c Beijing RENMIN RIBAO in Chinese 23 Sep 87 p 6

["Special Commentary" by Cao Ye (2580 0396) and Li Daozhong (2621 6670 1813): "A Mirror of the Present U.S.-Soviet Relations—Preliminary Analysis of the Agreement Reached in Principle Between the United States and the Soviet Union on Intermediate-range Missiles"]

[Text] The United States and the Soviet Union have recently reached an agreement in principle on the issue of intermediate-range missiles. The two sides also announced that their heads of government would meet in Washington by the end of this year. This is one of the year's major events in U.S.-Soviet relations and is being acclaimed by world media.

The United States and the Soviet Union finally made a breakthrough in a single field, namely, the issue of intermediate-range missiles, only after many meetings and protracted negotiations aimed at concluding an agreement on arms control. The two sides have agreed to remove their intermediate-range and intermediate to short-range missiles from Europe and Asia within 5 years. They have also worked out a set of corresponding procedures to verify the implementation of the agreement. It can be said that the conclusion of the U.S.-Soviet intermediate-range missile agreement has reflected to a certain extent the status quo of U.S.-Soviet relations.

Intermediate-range missile warheads account for about 3% of the total number of warheads in the U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals. The removal of intermediate-range missiles will have little influence on the two sides' military forces. However, as far as the intermediate-range missile agreement is concerned, both sides have gained what they had been looking for. Exchanging a smaller number of missiles of its own for a larger number of missiles of the Soviet Union, the United States has realized the "zero option" that the Reagan administration offered to its rival at the very beginning, and thus managing to do away with the threat of Soviet intermediate-range missiles against Western Europe. As for the Soviet Union, it has exchanged its intermediate-range missiles which cannot reach the United States proper for the U.S. intermediate-range missiles deployed in West-

ern Europe to threaten the western part of the Soviet Union, thus the threat of U.S. nuclear force against the Soviet Union will be reduced. From a political point of view, the intermediate-range missile agreement meets both sides' needs and has helped to ease U.S.-Soviet relations to a certain extent.

However, the intermediate-range missile agreement is nothing but a partial deal in the U.S.-Soviet arms control negotiations. It is of limited significance if viewed against the goal of all-round nuclear disarmament, and it allows no over-optimistic prediction of the prospects of U.S.-Soviet nuclear disarmament. Currently, there are some changes in the U.S.-Soviet strategic posture. As compared with the situation in the 1960's and the 1970's, the United States and the Soviet Union have now attached more importance to the competition in overall national power. At the moment, the two sides are maintaining a general balance of military power between them. As neither can overwhelm the other, both set greater store by the competition in overall national power in the next century. Now that the development of high technology has made it possible to develop an anti-missile defense system, the United States is vigorously launching its "Star Wars" program, and the Soviet Union, unwilling to lag behind, is trying very hard to catch up with its rival. This development indicates that both the United States and the Soviet Union have begun to shift their focus from a unitary structure mainly consisting of offensive nuclear arms to a complex structure with both offensive and defensive functions and, therefore, they can now be less dependent upon offensive nuclear weapons. It is under such circumstances that the intermediate-range missile agreement has been concluded.

The conclusion of the intermediate-range missile agreement implies that the two sides have taken a step in curtailing nuclear armament. One of the reasons why they have managed to reach the agreement is that the quantity of their nuclear arms has reached a super-saturated level. In the wake of development of high technology, the weapon updating cycle has become shorter and shorter. People are attaching greater importance to the improvement of quality rather than quantity. Curtailing of nuclear arms on a larger scale would not affect the actual military strength of the two sides.

but would instead enable them to concentrate their resources on competition in new technology. Despite great disparity between the United States and the Soviet Union in their stands regarding strategic weapons, they have agreed to cut their own strategic weapons by 50%. This is evidence of their intention. It appears that the U.S.-Soviet negotiations on arms control will continue after the conclusion of the intermediate-range missile agreement.

The conclusion of the intermediate-range missile agreement also indicates that there is a change in the U.S.-Soviet confrontation posture. The confrontation in Europe was escalated after the Soviet Union began to deploy SS-20 intermediate-range missiles in the mid 1970's. In this connection, NATO decided to replenish its armaments, the Reagan administration, in its initial period, pursued a hard line against the Soviet Union, and Western Europe carried out an intermediate-range missile counter-deployment plan. In this situation of confrontation and repeated negotiations, the Soviet Union finally decided to accept the "zero option" to simultaneously destroy intermediate-range missiles in both Europe and Asia and remove intermediate to short-range missiles from the European region. This is an important change in the Soviet Union's stand on the intermediate-range missile issue in recent years.

What must not be ignored is that the developing force for peace in the world has played a substantial role in pushing the U.S.-Soviet intermediate-range missile talks and the conclusion of the agreement. In recent years, the people of the world have voiced stronger and stronger demands for disarmament and development, which superpowers cannot defy. East and West European countries' appeal for detente and stability has also had a positive influence on the Soviet Union and the United States.

There is no doubt that the conclusion of the U.S.-Soviet intermediate-range missile agreement will have some influence on U.S.-Soviet relations, armament control, and the world situation. The detente in U.S.-Soviet relations and East-West relations will become a more obvious trend. The current development shows that the Soviet Union, in the hope of maintaining and pushing this trend, will possibly continue to assume the offensive on the arms control issue, which may result in some new proposals on disarmament. In response to this the United States will also have to adopt some countermeasures so that it will not be placed in a passive position. Therefore, some slow progress will possibly be made in the arms control talks, while economic relations, trade, cultural exchange, and personal contacts between the

East and the West will develop as well. But rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union will continue in certain aspects. Neither side will lightly make concessions on issues concerning the strategic defense system and the updating of nuclear armaments. What is more, as the United States will hold a general election next year, U.S. diplomacy will be pinned down. To be sure, the intermediate-range missile agreement will have positive effects on the relaxation of U.S.-Soviet relations. But its influence is limited. By the way, one cannot rule out the possibility of new tension between the two countries as a result of various factors. At the moment, differences of opinion over major principles still exist in U.S.-Soviet talks on strategic nuclear arms. In addition, the United States and the Soviet Union have different "three-in-one" structures of strategic nuclear forces, and these are also related to space weapons. Therefore, the complication and difficulty of the talks are incomparable to the case of intermediate-range missile talks. It seems impossible that any concrete agreement will be reached on the issue concerning these kinds of nuclear weapons during Reagan's present term of office. After the intermediate-range missiles are removed from Europe, NATO will still have more than 4,300 tactical nuclear weapons on hand, U.S. strategic nuclear submarines and 350,000 U.S. troops will still be stationed in Europe, while the Soviet Union will continue to maintain its nuclear and conventional forces. Therefore, the East-West military confrontation cannot possibly be reduced all at once.

In the Asian region, the United States and the Soviet Union will at last remove their intermediate-range missiles from there according to the same principle. This is a gratifying achievement. However, one must also notice that both the United States and the Soviet Union are unremittingly strengthening their military positions in Asia, and there is still a long way to go before those "hot spots" in this region are eliminated.

What is noteworthy is that the conclusion of the intermediate-range missile agreement does not mean that the United States and the Soviet Union are going to stop their arms race on earth and in space. Peace-loving countries and peoples in the world still have to press the United States and the Soviet Union to undertake special responsibility in disarmament with real actions, take the initiative in reducing all types of nuclear weapons by a wide margin, stop the space arms race, and substantially cut their conventional armaments. The development along all these lines will still be a test for their sincerity in disarmament.

XINHUA: UN REACTION TO INF ACCORD

Wu Xueqian Comments

52004001b Beijing XINHUA in English 0146 GMT 25 Sep 87

[Text] United Nations, September 24 (XINHUA)—Most 44 representatives who took the floor at the 42nd Session of the United Nations General Assembly in the past four days urged the Soviet Union and the United States to pursue serious negotiations for the drastic cuts in their nuclear and conventional arsenals.

Speakers welcomed the superpowers' agreement in principle to scrap all their intermediate- and shorter-range nuclear missiles and shared the hope that was just a first step towards comprehensive disarmament.

Denmark's Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, speaking for the 12 member states of the European Community, expressed the hope that "success in INF negotiations will give new impetus to U.S.-Soviet negotiations on other nuclear missiles and space systems."

Interviewed on the American ABC television network, Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov said the agreement only covers some three or four percent of all their nuclear weapons.

"They are just peanuts compared with strategic weapons," Gerasimov said.

But even before the two sides signed the INF treaty, U.S. President Ronald Reagan hailed in front of whole assembly Monday his pet program, the Strategic Defense Initiative, dubbed "Star Wars."

But many speakers, of today's speakers, particularly those from developing countries, reiterated the conclusion of the U.N.-sponsored international conference on disarmament and development, that more weapons do not mean more security.

On the contrary the overkill power of the superpowers' nuclear arsenals constitutes the biggest threat to human survival, the speakers declared.

This understanding was best expressed by the out-going president of the General Assembly, foreign minister of

Bangladesh, Humayun Rasheed Choudhury. "Acquisition of weapons does not enhance security, instead it spurs on the race to conflict," he said.

Mexico's Secretary of Foreign Relations Bernardo Sepulveda Amor expressed the positions put forward jointly by Argentina, India, Greece, Sweden, Tanzania and Mexico. These six nations advocate the "avoidance of the militarization of space and the prohibition of atomic weapons tests."

China, always a strong voice for disarmament at the United Nations, called again for complete prohibition and thorough destruction of all types of nuclear, space, chemical and biological weapons and any other weapons of mass destruction.

China's Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian told the assembly yesterday the U.S. and Soviets should "take the lead in drastically reducing their nuclear and conventional armaments".

More than one hundred speakers will address the assembly before general debate ends October 9.

'Round-up' on U.S., USSR Positions

OW251659 Beijing XINHUA in English 1519 GMT
25 Sep 87

["Round-up: U.S.-Soviet Rivalry Continues Despite Progress in Arms Talks (by Qian Wenrong)"]—XINHUA headline]

[Text] United Nations, September 24 (XINHUA)—Speeches by U.S. and Soviet leaders at the current U.N. General Assembly session indicate that the superpower rivalry still remains despite the progress in eliminating medium and shorter range missiles.

The United States and the Soviet Union scored a breakthrough in their decades-long arms debate when they reached a tentative agreement in principle last week to wipe out intermediate range missiles.

U.S. President Ronald Reagan, addressing the assembly on Monday, hailed the agreement as "a truly historic treaty." Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze told the delegates on Wednesday that "for the first time in history the idea of nuclear disarmament is close to the beginning of its fulfillment."

Both leaders also promised the delegates that the United States and the Soviet Union will continue discussing a possible 50 percent cut in their strategic nuclear arsenals.

Despite the buoyant atmosphere inspired by those speeches, delegates from many countries expressed doubt that either the United States or the Soviet Union will give up their arms race and global rivalry.

President Reagan in his speech attributed the U.S.-Soviet intermediate-range nuclear accord to his "Strategic Defense Initiative" (SDI), a space-based missile shield commonly known as the "Star Wars" program.

"SDI has greatly enhanced the prospects for real arms reduction. It is a crucial part of our efforts to ensure a

safer world and a more stable strategic balance," Reagan said.

Shevardnadze, who remained expressionless while other delegates applauded at the end of Reagan's speech, reaffirmed in his own address that there would be no further progress in Soviet-U.S. arms control talks if the United States proceeds with its "Star Wars" program.

For the past few years, the "Star Wars" project has stood in the way of any genuine progress in strategic nuclear arms talks between the superpowers. The Soviets have insisted that the talks could go nowhere unless the Reagan administration stalls its SDI program. The Soviet position, in turn, has been firmly rejected by the White House.

At the U.N. forum, the Soviet foreign minister repeated the call for the United States to abide by the 1972 Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, which banned the superpowers from developing space-based as well as land-based, sea-borne and air-borne mobile ABM systems.

Despite their high rhetoric, the two superpowers have never slowed down their efforts to develop new sophisticated weapons in recent years. Kremlin officials announced in August that they had started deploying the new SS-24 intercontinental ballistic missiles, each capable of carrying 10 warheads. Washington also has approved a test program for the first echelon of the ABM system, including interceptor missiles.

The two leaders' speeches also demonstrated that the United States and the Soviet Union have stepped up their scramble for control in strategic regions around the world, particularly in the Gulf region.

In his speech, Shevardnadze urged the United States to remove its war fleet from the Gulf, warning that the greater the military presence, the higher the probability of yet another conflict.

President Reagan, rejecting the withdrawal of U.S. military forces from the region, said that "for 40 years the United States has made clear its vital interest in the security of the Persian Gulf" and committed itself "to prevent the domination of the region by any hostile power".

Asked why the Soviet Union also sent warships to the Gulf region, Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov said here yesterday that the Gulf region is very important to the "security" of the Soviet Union because of its nearness to Soviet territory.

Gerasimov gave no indication that the Soviet fleet, which he described at the press conference as "very small," will be withdrawn from the Gulf region.

Most delegates who took the floor in the last four days expressed hope that the two superpowers, after reaching an agreement on intermediate nuclear forces (INF), would go further with earnest disarmament talks in other areas and guarantee that any agreements they do reach are implemented.

They also urged the two superpowers to stop their rivalry either for global or regional domination.

PRC PREMIER 'WELCOMES' INF ACCORD

5200401a Beijing XINHUA Domestic Service in Chinese 0822 GMT 28 Sep 8

[Excerpts] Beijing, 28 Sep (XINHUA)--Premier of the State Council Zhao Ziyang granted an interview to Tom Brokaw, a journalist from NBC of the U.S., at Zhongnanhai on 25 September. Following is the gist of Zhao Ziyang's replies to the journalist's questions:

Brokaw: It seems that Washington and Moscow are ready to enter into a new warmer era of relations. Do you worry about such a prospect?

Zhao: China welcomes the intermediate-range guided missile agreement reached in principle between the United States and the Soviet Union. We hope they will improve their relations. Better relations and less confrontation between the two will contribute to relaxation of international tension and world peace. It cannot be a source of worry to us.

/9274

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

BRIEFS

BELGIUM'S MARTENS ON MISSILE DEPLOYMENT, TREATY--In Brussels, Prime Minister Wilfried Martens said following a Cabinet meeting that Belgium would not deploy 32 extra Euromissiles at the end of the year if the treaty on the elimination of medium-range missiles was signed. On the other hand, we will have to have talks with our NATO partners to know if the 16 other cruise missiles stationed at the Florennes base for 2 years have to be dismantled, the prime minister said. [Text] [52002411a Brussels Domestic Service in French 1500 GMT 18 Sep 87] /9274

DUTCH PRIME MINISTER ON CRUISE MISSILE DEPLOYMENT--Netherlands Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers has said that the chances of U.S.-made nuclear weapons being stationed at Woensdrecht airbase in the south of the Netherlands are now minimal. The highly controversial cruise missiles are due to be deployed late next year. However, it's expected that before that time an accord will be in effect between the United States and the Soviet Union on the removal of all U.S. and Soviet medium- and short-range missiles. [Excerpt] [52002411b Hilversum International Service in English 1431 GMT 19 Sep 87] /9274

USSR: U.S. DECIDES TO ALLOW CW DUMP INSPECTION

LD040556 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0500 GMT 4 Nov 87

[Text] Washington, 4 November (TASS)—The United States has decided to open up one of its closed military installations where chemical munitions are stored and admit representatives from the Soviet Union into it to see U.S. technology for destroying chemical weapons. This was announced here on Tuesday by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. A delegation of experts and diplomats from the Soviet Union will visit the installation at Tooele (Utah) this month to see technology adopted in the United States for destroying chemical weapons, UPI reports. The Soviet Union was first to carry out such an act, having invited delegations from 45 countries and Soviet and foreign journalists to a closed military installation at Shikhany at the beginning of October. They were shown standard models of chemical munitions which the USSR armed forces have at their disposal, as well as Soviet technology for destroying chemical weapons safely.

/8309

CSO: 52001011

SOVIET JOURNAL VIEWS TREATY OF TLATELOLCO ON 20TH ANNIVERSARY

Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 5, May 87 pp 37-40

[Article by V.L. Orlov: "Steps Toward a Nonnuclear World"]

[Text] The year 1987 marked 20 years from the day the Tlatelolco Treaty was signed. The struggle to create a nonnuclear zone on the continent developed in the early 1960's. In March 1962 the Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs Manuel Telio spoke at the Committee of 18 States on Disarmament and stated that before a general treaty was signed "deatomization could, can, and must be carried out on the basis of voluntary decisions of states" and that his government had "decided not to have and not to allow any types of nuclear weapons or any means which could be used to deliver such weapons on their national territory."

The initiative of the President of Mexico A. Lopez Mateos became an important milestone of "deatomization"; on 21 March 1963 he sent letters to the presidents of Brazil, Chile, Bolivia, and Ecuador and proposed that they make a joint statement on turning the continent into a nonnuclear zone. As a result on 29 April 1963 the presidents of these countries published the joint Declaration to Proclaim Latin America a Zone Free from Nuclear Weapons. The document expressed the proposal to conclude a multilateral agreement by which the continent's countries "would obligate themselves not to produce, nor obtain, nor store, nor test nuclear weapons or means of delivering them" and emphasized that "the conclusion of a regional Latin American agreement may encourage the adoption of a treaty agreement on a worldwide scale."

At the Eighth Session of the UN General Assembly Bolivia, Brazil, Haiti, Costa Rica, Mexico, Panama, El Salvador, Uruguay, Chile, and Ecuador introduced a draft of a resolution which brought to attention the declaration of the five presidents to declare Latin America a nonnuclear zone and contained the desire that the region's states begin to study measures to achieve the goals of this declaration. On 27 November 1963 the draft of this resolution was adopted by the UN General Assembly.

In 1965-1967 a preparatory commission to develop the multilateral agreement worked in Mexico under the leadership of the prominent Mexican jurist Alfonso Garcia Robles. This commission's activity ended with the signing on 14 February 1967 at the Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs by 14 Latin

American countries of the Treaty to Prohibit Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, better known as the Tlatelolco Treaty (named after the region in Mexico City where the MFA [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] building is located). And on 25 April 1969 after its ratification by the 11th state--Barbados--the treaty went into effect. In September of that same year the Agency to Prohibit Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL) began to function; it was a special organization created to monitor the fulfillment of the treaty obligations.

In recent years an absolute majority of the continent's states have joined the agreement. However, 22 states are full participants in it: Mexico, El Salvador, the Dominican Republic, Uruguay, Honduras, Nicaragua, Ecuador, Bolivia, Peru, Paraguay, Barbados, Haiti, Jamaica, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Venezuela, Panama, Colombia, Grenada, Trinidad and Tobago, Surinam, and the Bahamas. The point is that in order to join the treaty, in addition to signing and ratifying it, a special declaration to put the treaty into effect is also supposed to be adopted. But certain states (including Argentina, Brazil, and Chile) disagree with certain provisions of it and signed and ratified the agreement but did not adopt declarations to put it into effect and thereby did not put the treaty into operation.

Cuba is also not a participant in the treaty. In principle supporting the idea of nonnuclear zones, it justified its refusal to participate by saying that the United States does not offer reliable guarantees that it will not deploy nuclear weapons in the region, including at Guantanamo Base located on Cuba's territory.

The main goal of this international legal document is to prohibit nuclear weapons in any form on the territory of all of Latin America. The regions' states are obliged to use nuclear energy and nuclear materials and equipment exclusively for peaceful purposes. Two additional protocols are supposed to guarantee the continent's nonnuclear status. Protocol 1 charges the obligation of observing the treaty's provisions on countries which de jure or de facto possess territories in the zone to which the treaty's effect extends, that is, the United States, Great Britain, France, and the Netherlands. But Protocol 2 envisions the nuclear powers assuming obligations to respect the status of the nonnuclear zone in regard to the treaty participants.

At the same time the text of the agreement has certain formulas which lessen the significance of the regime of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons which it proclaims. First, there are no precise provisions to prohibit the transport (transit) of nuclear weapons across the territory of the participating states by third countries. Therefore the situation arises where the very principle of "deatomization" is violated. The United States maintaining its right to deploy nuclear weapons at the base on Guantanamo, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands and to transport them across the Panama Canal undermines the nonnuclear status of the zone.

Secondly, the treaty recognizes the right for the participating states to explode nuclear devices for peaceful purposes--including explosions which presuppose using mechanisms similar to those used in nuclear weapons (Article 18), which contradicts the Treaty on Nonproliferation of Nuclear

Weapons which most of the countries of the world signed, including many countries in the region.

Finally, it is not clear whether the obligations of the countries which signed the treaty operate outside the "zone of application" or if they can participate in tests of nuclear weapons outside this zone as well as obtain nuclear weapons with the condition of keeping them outside the zone.

Despite certain shortcomings, the Tlatelolco Treaty substantially strengthens the regime of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. Its ideas have a great deal of influence on many countries which are trying to safeguard themselves against the nuclear threat. Thus, on 6 August 1985 13 countries which are members of the South Pacific Forum signed the Treaty on the Nonnuclear Zone in the Southern Part of the Pacific Ocean. In the east its borders touch the Latin American nonnuclear zone and in the south--the region of effect of the Antarctica Treaty, by which this region was essentially turned into a nonnuclear zone. As a result an enormous, practically unified territory of the Earth is being formed which is free of nuclear weapons. In this way the real prerequisites for the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons practically throughout the Southern Hemisphere have taken shape.

Brazil's proposal to turn South America into a nonnuclear zone was a major step on the way to this. Speaking in September 1986 at the Organization of American States headquarters, President J. Sarney said: "Brazil's initiative is focused on turning the region in the southern part of the Atlantic Ocean from the shores of Africa to Latin America into a region of peace and cooperation among coastal states." The formation of this zone can be achieved as an addendum to the Tlatelolco Treaty.¹

The goal of this important initiative, in the words of the Brazilian leader, is to protect the region from tension and the arms race, which is necessary for the countries of Latin America and Africa to successfully resolve the complex economic problems facing them, exploit the mineral wealth of the Atlantic Ocean, create the corresponding climate of trust, and, ultimately, to consolidate universal peace. It is therefore natural that this proposal received the broad support of a number of Latin American and African states located along the Atlantic coast and was the basis of the document introduced for review of the 41st Session of the UN General Assembly by 11 states of the 2 continents. On 27 October 1986 the resolution declaring the South Atlantic a zone of peace and cooperation was adopted by an overwhelming majority of votes (124 votes for, 8 votes abstaining, and 1 vote [the United States] against). The resolution contains an appeal to all states to rigorously observe the region's status by reducing and ultimately eliminating the military presence and not deploying nuclear and other types of mass destruction weapons and points out the need to cooperate in eliminating the centers of tension in this region, to respect the sovereignty, political independence, and territorial integrity of the states located in it, and to abstain from the threat of force or its use.

The situation in which the Brazilian proposal appeared is in many respects similar to the one in which the Tlatelolco Treaty was worked out. In the same way that the Caribbean crisis provided the impetus for creating a nonnuclear

zone in Latin America, the armed conflict between Great Britain and Argentina was the direct cause and catalyst of the emergence of the idea of creating a zone of peace and cooperation in the South Atlantic. And that is very significant. Obviously, the region's countries are trying to counter local conflicts which in present conditions are fraught with the danger of developing into a war using nuclear weapons with a system of security which would guarantee preserving the condition of peace in this region, and hence, would help consolidate peace on Earth as a whole. While in the first postwar years it was believed that questions of nuclear disarmament were the sphere of activity of the great powers, above all the USSR and the United States, a number of foreign policy documents--from the Tlatelolco Treaty to the formation of the "Delhi Six" and Brazil's proposal to create a nonnuclear zone in the South Atlantic--are evidence of the essential change in the position of the continent's states on this fundamental problem of modern times.

It is therefore natural that the Latin American countries' struggle for a nonnuclear world causes dissatisfaction in Washington. By trying to thwart these peace-loving efforts, the United States directly pits itself against the international community. The American representative in the UN voted against Brazil's proposal, justifying it by saying that "the text of the resolution 'may affect' the sea lanes and restrict the principle of free navigation." However, the whole point is that the proposal to rid the South Atlantic of nuclear arms contradicts U.S. policy to build up the military potential in this region. As Ch. Redman, the State Department representative, said, "the growing number of proposals on regional nonnuclear zones might potentially undermine the policy of deterrence which has been the cornerstone of the West's security since World War II times.² Thus the Reagan administration expressed a negative attitude toward the antinuclear sentiments which have enveloped the developing countries.

At the same time these sentiments are encountering active support on the part of the Soviet Union. A consistent supporter of creating nonnuclear zones in various regions of the world, the USSR sees in this an important means of struggle to end the arms race and strengthen the regime of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. The USSR supports the Tlatelolco Treaty, advocating that the zone's status be fully observed. The desire to prevent the militarization of the South Atlantic and turn it into a one of peace and cooperation was highly praised. In December 1986 the Soviet representative signed protocols to the Rapotonga Treaty on strict observance of the status of the southern part of the Pacific Ocean.

FOOTNOTES

1. PRAVDA, 14 September 1986.
2. PRAVDA, 7 February 1987.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo "Nauka", "Latinskaya Amerika", 1987

12424

CSO: 1807/357

SOVIET COMMENTATOR ON NORTH EUROPE NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE

LD152200 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1900 GMT 14 Oct 87

[Text] [Announcer] The Soviet Union and other socialist countries are continuing their peace campaign, doing everything they can to free mankind from the threat of nuclear catastrophe. Nuclear-free zones in various regions of our planet play an important part in the broad complex of measures they proposed. The purpose of setting up demilitarized zones, where nuclear weapons should neither be manufactured nor deployed, was pointed out by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev in his recent speech in Murmansk.

Very often in the letters arriving at our editorial office, radio listeners ask: What is the history of the nuclear-free zone proposals? What guarantees should the nuclear powers give countries inside a nuclear-free zone? We asked TASS military affairs commentator Vladimir Bogachev to tell us about this. Over to you.

[Bogachev] In 1963, Finnish President Urho Kekkonen proposed that a nuclear weapons-free zone be created in northern Europe. The United Nations approved this idea. Finland's initiative was welcomed by the world public. Disarmament experts stressed that creation of such a zone in northern Europe would lessen the threat of a nuclear war for the 23 million people living in Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Finland. It would help improve the overall climate of international relations.

The Soviet Union expressed its readiness to act as a guarantor of a nuclear-free zone in that region and to take a series of measures on its own territory to consolidate its status as a nuclear-free zone. In particular, the USSR was already unilaterally dismantling its medium-range missile launchers on the Kola Peninsula and most of its launchers for such missiles in the Leningrad and Baltic military districts. Many Soviet operational-tactical weapons were withdrawn from these districts. Military exercises are restricted there. The USSR is prepared to take on the obligation not to use nuclear weapons against those states in northern Europe that become participants in a nuclear-free zone. The Soviet Union's pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons received a tremendous response throughout the world. This decision opened up new, reassuring prospects for agreement on nuclear-free zones.

[Announcer] Vladimir Ivanovich, please tell us where nuclear-free zones exist in the world.

[Bogachev] Twenty years ago, a treaty was signed in the Mexican capital banning nuclear weapons in Latin America. It is known as the Tlatelolco Treaty. The treaty imposes on its signatories the obligation to ban production, deployment, or testing of nuclear weapons on their territory.

Although the United States, along with all the other nuclear powers, signed the protocol obliging them to respect the status of that nuclear-free zone, Washington is undermining the spirit of the treaty. The United States is unceremoniously carrying out nuclear tests in the immediate proximity of Latin America.

On 6 August 1985, at a meeting of the South Pacific Forum on the Island of Rorotonga, a treaty was approved making the southern part of the Pacific a nuclear-free zone. The countries taking part were Australia, Western Samoa, Kiribati, the Cook Islands, Niue, New Zealand, and others. They decided to give up production, acquisition, and deployment on their territory of any kind of nuclear device. They also banned nuclear explosions and burial of radioactive waste. The Soviet Union and China signed the protocols to stem that threat and thereby pledged themselves to respect the zone's nuclear-free status. The United States, Britain, and France, however, refused to sign the treaty. They said such an agreement might undermine their nuclear deterrence policy.

[Announcer] Where else could nuclear-free zones be set up in the near future?

[Bogachev] The socialist community welcomed Sweden's initiative to establish in Europe a corridor free of battlefield and short-range nuclear weapons along the line of contact between the Warsaw Treaty states and the NATO states. The socialist countries believe that to make the corridor more effective, it should be widened on both sides, taking into account tactical and technical specifications of those weapons. Bulgaria and Romania proposed the creation of a nuclear-free zone in the Balkans. The question of the nuclear-free status of northern Europe is being discussed seriously.

[Announcer] But what position are the United States and other NATO countries taking regarding the proposal to turn northern Europe into a nuclear-free zone?

[Bogachev] The United States is categorically opposed to a nuclear-free zone in northern Europe. Washington is trying to force Denmark and Norway to reverse their decisions not to deploy nuclear weapons on their territory in peacetime. The United States wants to force the Scandinavian countries in NATO to reconcile themselves to gradual deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons on their soil. Time and again, the Pentagon sends warships armed with nuclear weapons into their waters and U.S. Air Force planes to their airfields. Washington has long been trying to expand its bridgeheads for unleashing a limited nuclear war in Europe, thereby encroaching on the Scandinavian states' security interests.

Reports have already appeared that the United States is testing its sea- and air-based cruise missiles in the North Atlantic. This means that the flight paths of the U.S. cruise missiles will cross Danish, Norwegian, Swedish, and Finnish territories.

The U.S. Administration also opposes a nuclear-free zone in northern Europe because its creation might become a precedent for further reductions in the region's military activity.

In conclusion, I would like to say our country comes out resolutely against senseless competition in producing and stockpiling weapons of mass destruction. Such an approach by the USSR to the problems of war and peace was specifically expressed in the Soviet Government program to free mankind of nuclear weapons in the current century. The concern to strengthen stability throughout the world is dictated by Soviet efforts to provide favorable conditions for setting up nuclear-free zones. The formation of nuclear-free zones is one of the aims of the Soviet peace campaign.

/8309

CSO: 52001006

GORBACHEV ARTICLE ON 'SECURE WORLD'

52001647 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 17 Sep 87 Second Edition pp 1-2

[Article by M.S. Gorbachev, CPSU Central Committee general secretary, headlined: "The Reality and Guarantees of a Secure World"; passages in boldface as published]

The 42d session of the UN General Assembly opened a few days ago. It is this fact that suggested the idea of this article. Objective processes are making our complex and diverse world increasingly interrelated and interdependent. It increasingly needs a mechanism which is capable of discussing its common problems in a responsible fashion and at a representative level and being a place for the mutual search for a balance of differing, contradictory, yet real, interests of the contemporary community of states and nations. The United Nations organization is called upon to be such a mechanism by its underlying idea and its origin. We are confident that it is capable of fulfilling that role. This is why in the first autumn days, when the period of holidays is over and the international political life is rapidly gathering momentum, when an opportunity for important decisions in the disarmament field can be discerned, we, in the Soviet leadership, deemed it useful to share our ideas on the basic issues of world politics at the end of the 20th century. It seems all the more appropriate since the current session of the UN General Assembly is devoted to major aspects of such politics.

It is natural that what we would like to do first of all in this connection is to try and see for ourselves what the idea of the establishment of a **comprehensive system of international security**—the idea advanced at the 27th CPSU Congress—looks like now that 1.5 years have passed since the congress. This idea has won backing from many states. Our friends—the socialist countries and members of the Nonaligned Movement—are our active co-authors.

The article offered to you deals primarily with our approach to the formation of such a system. At the same time it is an invitation for the United Nations member-countries and the world public to exchange views. I.

The last quarter of the 20th century has been marked by changes in the material aspect of being—changes revo-

lutionary in their content and significance. For the first time in its history mankind became capable of resolving many problems that were hindering its progress over centuries. From the standpoint of the existing and newly-created resources and technologies there are no impediments to feeding the population of many billion, from giving it education, providing it with housing and keeping it healthy. Given obvious differences and potentialities of some or other peoples and countries, there has taken shape a prospect for ensuring befitting conditions of life for the inhabitants of the earth.

At the same time dangers have emerged which put into question the very immortality of the human race. This is why new rules of coexistence on our unique planet are badly needed and they should conform to the new requirements and the changed conditions.

Alas, many influential forces continue adhering to outdated conceptions concerning ways for ensuring national security. As a result the world is in an absurd situation whereby persistent efforts are being made to convince it that the road to an abyss is the most correct one.

It would be difficult to appraise in any other way the point of view that nuclear weapons allegedly make it possible to avert a world war. It is not simple to refute it precisely because it is totally unfounded. For one has to dispute something which is being passed off as an axiom—since no world war has broken out after the emergence of nuclear weapons, hence, it is these weapons which have averted it. It seems that it is more correct to say that a world war has been averted despite the existence of nuclear weapons.

Some time back the sides had several scores of atomic bombs apiece, then each came to possess a hundred of nuclear missiles, and finally, the arsenals grew to include several thousands of nuclear warheads. Not so long ago Soviet and American scientists specially studied the issue of the relationship between the strategic stability and the size of the nuclear arsenals. They arrived at the unanimous conclusion that 95 percent of all nuclear arms of the United States and the USSR can be eliminated without stability being disrupted. This is a killing

argument against the "nuclear deterrence" strategy that gives birth to a mad logic. We believe that the 5 percent should not be retained either. Then the stability will be qualitatively different.

Not laying claims to instructing anyone and having come to realize that mere statements about the dangerous situation in the world are unproductive, we began seeking an answer to the question if it was possible to have a model for ensuring national security which would not be fraught with the threat of a world-wide catastrophe.

Such an approach was in the mainstream of the conceptions that had taken shape during the process of evolving the new political thinking permeated with a realistic view of what is surrounding us and what is happening round, of ourselves—the view characterized by an unbiased attitude to others and the awareness of our own responsibility and security.

The new thinking is the bridging of the gap between the word and the deed, and we embarked on practical deeds. Being confident that nuclear weapons are the greatest evil and the most horrible threat we announced a unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests which we observed, let me put it straight, longer than we could have done ... Then came the 15 January 1986 statement putting forth a concrete program for a stage-by-stage elimination of nuclear weapons. At the meeting with President Reagan in Reykjavik we came close to the realization of the desirability and possibility of complete nuclear disarmament. Then we made steps which made it easier to approach an agreement on the elimination of two classes of nuclear arms—medium- and shorter-range missiles.

We believe that it is possible and realistic. In this connection I would like to note that the Government of the FRG assumed the stand which is conducive to it to a certain extent. The Soviet Union is proceeding from the premise that a relevant treaty could be worked out before the end of the current year. Much has been said about its potential advantages. I will not repeat them. I would only like to note that it would deal a tangible blow at concepts of limited use of nuclear weapons and the so-called "controllable escalation" of a nuclear conflict. There are no illusory intermediate options. The situation is becoming more stable.

This treaty on medium- and shorter-range missiles would be a fine prelude to a breakthrough at the talks on large-scale—50 percent—reductions in strategic offensive arms in conditions of the strict observance of the ABM Treaty. I believe that, given the mutual striving, an accord on that matter could become a reality as early as in the first half of the next year.

While thinking of advancing toward a nuclear weapon-free world it is essential to see to it even now that security be ensured in the process of disarmament, at each of its stages, and to think not only about that, but also to agree on mechanisms for maintaining peace at drastically reduced levels of non-nuclear armaments.

All these questions were included into proposals set forth jointly by the USSR and other socialist countries at the

United Nations—the proposals for the establishment of a comprehensive system of international peace and security.

What should it be like, as we see it?

The security plan proposed by us provides, above all, for continuity and concord with the existing institutions for the maintenance of peace. The system could function on the basis of the UN Charter and within the framework of the United Nations. In our view, its ability to function will be ensured by the strict observance of the charter's demands, additional unilateral obligations of states as well as confidence measures and international cooperation in all spheres—politico-military, economic, ecological, humanitarian and others.

I do not venture to foretell how the system of all-embracing security would appear in its final form. It is only clear that it could become a reality only if all means of mass annihilation were destroyed. We propose that all this be pondered by an independent commission of experts and specialists which would submit its conclusions to the United Nations Organization.

Personally, I have no doubt about the capability of sovereign states to assume obligations in the field of international security right now. Many states are already doing this. As is known, the Soviet Union and the PRC have stated that they will not be the first to use nuclear arms. The Soviet-American agreements on nuclear armaments are another example. They contain a conscious choice of restraint and self-limitation in the most sensitive sphere of relations between the USSR and the United States. Or take the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. What is it? It is a unique example of a high sense of responsibility of states.

In the present-day reality there already exists "bricks" from which one can start building the future system of security.

The sphere of the reasonable, responsible and rational organisation of international affairs is expanding before our very eyes, though admittedly timidly. Previously unknown standards of openness, glasnost, of the scope and depth of mutual monitoring and verification of compliance with adopted obligations are being established. A U.S. inspection team visits an area where exercises of Soviet troops are held, a group of U.S. Congressmen already inspects the Krasnoyarsk radar station, U.S. scientists install and adjust their instruments in the area of the Soviet nuclear testing range. Soviet and American observers are present at each other's military exercises. Annual plans of military activity are published in accordance with accords within the framework of the Helsinki process.

I do not know of weightier and more impressive argument in support of the fact that the situation is changing than the stated readiness of a nuclear power voluntarily to renounce nuclear weapons. References to a striving to replace them with conventional armaments in which there supposedly exists an imbalance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact in the latter's favor are unjustified. If

an imbalance, disproportions exist, let us remove them. We do not tire saying this all the time and we have proposed concrete ways of solving this problem.

In all these issues the Soviet Union is a pioneer and shows that its words are matched by its deeds.

The question of the comparability of defence spending? Here we will have to put in more work. I think that given proper effort already within the next 2 or 3 years we will be able to compare the figures that are of interest to us and our partners and which would symmetrically reflect the expenditures of the sides.

The Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space arms, the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons which is close to being concluded will intensify. I am sure, the advance to detente and disarmament.

An accord on "defense strategy" and "military sufficiency" could impart a powerful impulse in this direction. These notions presuppose such a structure of the armed forces of a state that they would be sufficient to repulse a possible aggression but would not be sufficient for the conduct of offensive actions. The first step to this could be a controlled withdrawal of nuclear and other offensive weapons from the borders with a subsequent creation along borders of strips of reduced [razrezhennykh] armaments and demilitarized zones between potential, let us put it this way, adversaries; while in principle we should work for the dissolution of military blocs and the liquidation of bases on foreign territories and the return home of all troops stationed abroad.

The question of a possible mechanism to prevent the outbreak of a nuclear conflict is more complex. Here I approach the most sensitive point of the idea of all-embracing security: much will have to be additionally thought out, rethought [as published] and worked out. In any case, the international community should work out agreed-upon measures for the event of a violation of the all-embracing agreement on the non-use and elimination of nuclear arms or an attempt to violate this agreement. As to potential nuclear piracy, it appears possible and necessary to consider in advance and prepare collective measures to prevent it.

If the system is sufficiently effective then the more so it will provide effective guarantees of averting and curbing a non-nuclear aggression.

The system proposed by us precisely presupposes a definiteness of measures which would enable the United Nations Organization, the main universal security body, to ensure its maintenance at a level of reliability. II.

- The division of the world's countries into those possessing nuclear weapons and those not possessing them has split also the very concept of security. But for human life security is indivisible. In this sense it is not only a political, military, juridical but also a moral category. Contentions that there has been no war for already half a century do not withstand any test on the touchstone of ethics. How come there is no war? There are dozens of regional wars flaring in the world.

It is immoral to treat this as something second rate. The matter, however, is not only in the impermissible nuclear haughtiness. The elimination of nuclear weapons would also be a major step toward a genuine democratization of relations between states, their equality and equal responsibility.

Unconditional observance of the UN Charter and the right of peoples sovereignly to choose the roads and forms of their development, revolutionary or evolutionary, is an imperative condition of universal security. This applies also to the right to social status quo. This, too, is exclusively an internal matter. Any attempts, direct or indirect, to influence the development of "not one of our own" countries, to interfere in this development should be ruled out. Just as impermissible are attempts to destabilize existing governments from outside.

At the same time the world community cannot stay away from inter-state conflicts. Here it could be possible to begin by fulfilling the proposal made by the UN secretary general to set up under the UN Organization a multilateral center for lessening the danger of war. Evidently, it would be feasible to consider the expediency of setting up a direct communication line between the UN headquarters and the capitals of the countries that are permanent members of the Security Council and the location of the chairman of the Nonaligned Movement.

It appears to us that with the aim of strengthening trust and mutual understanding it could be possible to set up under the aegis of the UN Organization a mechanism for extensive international verification of compliance with agreements to lessen international tension, limit armaments and for monitoring the military situation in conflict areas. The mechanism would function using various forms and methods of monitoring to collect information and promptly submit it to the United Nations. This would make it possible to have an objective picture of the events taking place, to timely detect preparations for hostilities, impede a sneak attack, take measures to avert an armed conflict, prevent it from expanding and becoming worse.

We are arriving at the conclusion that wider use should be made of the institute of UN military observers and UN peace-keeping forces in disengaging the troops of warring sides, observing ceasefire and armistice agreements.

Of course at all stages of a conflict extensive use should be made of all means of a peaceful settlement of disputes and differences between states and one should offer one's good offices, one's mediation with the aim of achieving an armistice. The ideas and initiatives concerning nongovernmental commissions and groups which would analyze the causes, circumstances and methods of resolving various concrete conflict situations appear to be fruitful.

The Security Council permanent members could become guarantors of regional security. They could, on their part, assume the obligation not to sue force or the threat of force, to renounce demonstrative military presence. This

is so because such a practice is one of the factors of fanning up regional conflicts.

A drastic intensification and expansion of the cooperation of states in uprooting international terrorism is extremely important. It would be expedient to concentrate this cooperation within the framework of the United Nations Organization. In our opinion, it would be useful to create under its aegis a tribunal and investigate acts of international terrorism.

More coordination in the struggle against apartheid as a destabilizing factor of international magnitude would also be justified.

As we see it, all the above-stated measures could be organically built into an all-embracing system of peace and security. III. [Roman three]

The events and tendencies of the past decades have expanded this concept, imparting new features and specificities to it. One of them is the problem of economic security. A world in which a whole continent can find itself on the brink of death from starvation and in which huge masses of people are suffering from almost permanent malnutrition is not a safe world. Neither is a world safe in which a multitude of countries and peoples are stifling in a noose of debt.

The economic interests of individual countries or their groups are indeed so different and contradictory that consensus with regard to the concept of the new world economic order seems to be hard to achieve. We do hope, however, that the instinct of self-preservation should snap into action here as well. It is sure to manifest itself if it becomes possible to look into the chain of priorities and see that there are circumstances, menacing in their inevitability, and that it is high time that the inert political mentality inherited from the past views of the outside world be abandoned. This world has ceased to be a sphere which the big and strong divided into domains and zones of "vital interests."

The imperatives of the times compel us to elevate many common sense notions to the level of policy. It is not philanthropy which prompted our proposal to agree on the reduction of interest payments under bank credits and the elaboration of extra benefits for the least developed nations. This holds benefit for all, namely a secure future. If the debt burden of the developing world is alleviated, the chances for such a future will grow. It is also possible to limit debt payments by each developing country to the share of its annual export earnings without detriment to development, accept export commodities in payment for the debt, remove protectionist barriers on the borders of creditor-nations and stop adding extra interest when deferring payments under debts.

There may be different attitudes to these proposals. There is no doubt, however, that the majority of international community members realize the need for immediate actions to alleviate the developing world's debt burden. If that is so, it is possible to start working out the programme through concerted effort.

These words "through concerted effort" are very important for today's world. The relationship between disarmament and development, confirmed at the recent international conference in New York, can be implemented if none of the strong and rich keep themselves aloof. I already expressed the view that Security Council member states, represented by their top officials, could jointly discuss this problem and work out a coordinated approach. I confirm this proposal.

Ecological security. It is dangerous in the direct meaning of the word when currents of poison flow along river channels, when poisonous rains pour down from the sky, when the atmosphere polluted with industrial and transport waste chokes cities and whole regions, when the development of atomic engineering is justified by unacceptable risks.

Many have suddenly begun to perceive all that not as something abstract, but as quite a real part of their own experience. The confidence that "this won't affect us," characteristic of the past outlook, has disappeared. They say that one thorn of experience is worth more than a whole wood of instructions. For us, Chernobyl became such a thorn...

The relationship between man and the environment has become menacing. Problems of ecological security affect all—the rich and the poor. What is required is the global strategy of environmental protection and the rational use of resources. We suggest starting its elaboration within the framework of the UN special program.

States already exchange appropriate information and notify international organizations of developments. We believe that this order should be legitimized by introducing the principle of governments' annual report about their conservationist activity and about ecological incidents, both those that occurred and those that were prevented on the territory of their countries.

Realizing the need for opening a common front of economic and ecological security and starting its formation mean defusing a delayed-action bomb planted deep inside mankind's existence by history, by people themselves. IV.

Human rights. One can name all top statesmen of our times who threatened to use nuclear weapons. Some may object: It is one thing to threaten and another to use. Indeed, they haven't used them. But campaigning for human rights is in no way compatible with the threat to use weapons of mass destruction. We hold it is unacceptable to talk about human rights and liberties while intending to hang in outer space overhead the "chandeliers" of exotic weapons. The only down-to-earth element in that "exoticism" is the potentiality of mankind's annihilation. The rest is in dazzling wrapping.

I agree: The world cannot be considered secure if human rights are violated in it. I will only add: If a large part of this world has no elementary conditions for a life worthy of man, if millions of people have the full "right" to go hungry, to have no roof over their head and to be jobless and sick indefinitely when treatment is something they

cannot afford, if, finally, the basic human right, the right to life, is disregarded.

First of all, it is necessary that national legislation and administrative rules in the humanitarian sphere everywhere be brought in accordance with international obligations and standards.

Simultaneously it would be possible to turn to coordinating a broad selection of practical steps, for instance, to working out a world information program under UN auspices to familiarize peoples with one another's life, the life as it is, not as someone would like to present it. That is precisely why such a project should envisage ridding the flow of information of the "enemy image" stereotypes, of bias, prejudices and absurd concoctions, of the distortion and unscrupulous violation of the truth.

There is much promise in the task of coordinating unified international legal criteria for resolving in the humanitarian spirit issues of family reunification, marriages, contacts between people and organizations, visa regulations and so on. What has been achieved on this account within the framework of the all-European process should be accepted as a starting point.

We favor the establishment of a special fund of humanitarian cooperation of the United Nations formed from voluntary state and private contributions on the basis of the reduction of military spending.

It is advisable that all states join the UNESCO conventions in the sphere of culture, including the conventions on protecting the world cultural heritage, on the means of prohibiting and preventing the illicit import, export and transfer of ownership of cultural property.

The alarming signals of the recent times have pushed to the top of the agenda the idea of creating a world-wide network of medical cooperation in treating most dangerous diseases, including AIDS, and combating drug addiction and alcoholism. The existing WHO structures make it possible to establish such a network at relatively short notice. The leaders of the world movement of physicians have big ideas on this account.

Dialogue on humanitarian problems could be conducted on a bilateral basis, within the forms of negotiation that have already been established. Besides, we propose holding it also within the framework of an international conference in Moscow: We made the proposal at the Vienna meeting in November last year.

Pooling efforts in the sphere of culture, medicine and humanitarian rights is yet another integral part of the system of comprehensive security. V.

- * The suggested system of comprehensive security will be effective to the extent in which the United Nations, its Security Council, and other international institutes and mechanisms will effectively function. It will be required to enhance resolutely the authority and role of the United Nations and the IAEA. The need for establishing a world space organization is clearly felt. It could work in the future in close contact with the United Nations as an autonomous part of its system. UN specialized agencies

should also become regulators of international processes. The Geneva Conference on Disarmament should become a forum that would internationalize the efforts on transition to a nuclear-free, nonviolent world.

One should not forget the capacities of the international court either. The general assembly and the Security Council could approach it more often for consultative conclusions on international law disputes. Its mandatory jurisdiction should be recognized by all on mutually agreed upon conditions. The permanent members of the Security Council, taking into account special responsibility, are to make the first step in that direction.

We are convinced that a comprehensive system of security is at the same time a system of universal law and order ensuring the primacy of international law in politics.

The UN Charter gives extensive powers to the Security Council. Joint efforts are required to ensure that it could use them effectively. For this purpose, there would be sense in holding meetings of the Security Council at foreign ministers' level when opening a regular session of the General Assembly to review the international situation and jointly look for effective ways for its improvement.

It would be useful to hold meetings of the Security Council not only at UN headquarters in New York, but also in regions of friction and tension and alternate them among the capitals of the permanent member states.

Special missions of the Council to regions of actual and potential conflicts would also help consolidate its authority and enhance the effectiveness of decisions adopted.

We are convinced that cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations could be considerably expanded. Its aim is the search for a political settlement of crisis situations.

In our view, it is important to hold special sessions of the General Assembly on the more urgent political problems and individual disarmament issues more often if the efficiency of latter's work is to be improved.

We emphatically stress the need for making the status of important political documents passed at the United Nations by consensus more binding morally and politically. Let me recall that they include, among others, the final document of the first special session of the UN General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the charter of economic rights and obligations of states, and others.

In our opinion, we should have set up long ago a world consultative council under UN auspices uniting the world's intellectual elite. Prominent scientists, political and public figures, representatives of international public organizations, cultural workers, people in literature and the arts, including laureates of the Nobel prize and other international prizes of world-wide significance, and eminent representatives of the churches could seriously enrich the spiritual and ethical potential of contemporary world politics.

To ensure that the United Nations and its specialized agencies operate at full capacity one should come to realize that it is impermissible to use financial levers for bringing pressure to bear on it. The Soviet Union will continue to cooperate actively in overcoming budget difficulties arising at the United Nations.

Finally, about the UN secretary general. The international community elects an authoritative figure enjoying everybody's trust to that high post. Since the secretary general is functioning as a representative of every member-country of the organization all states should give him the maximum of support and help him in fulfilling his responsible mission. The international community should encourage the UN secretary general in his missions of good offices, mediation, and reconciliation.

Why are we so persistent in raising the question of a comprehensive system of international peace and security?

Simply because it is impossible to put up with the situation in which the world has found itself on the threshold of the third millenium—in the face of a threat of annihilation, in a state of constant tension, in an atmosphere of suspicion and strife, spending huge funds and quantities of work and talent of millions of people only to increase mutual mistrust and fears.

One can speak as much as he pleases about the need for terminating the arms race, uprooting militarism, or about cooperation. Nothing will change unless we start acting.

The political and moral core of the problem is the trust of the states and peoples in one another, respect for international agreements and institutions. We are prepared to switch from confidence measures in individual spheres to a large-scale policy of trust which would gradually shape a system of comprehensive security. But such a policy should be based on the unity of political statements and real positions.

The idea of a comprehensive system of security is the first plan for a possible new organization of life in our common planetary home. In other words, it is a pass into the future where security of all is a token of the security for everyone. We hope that the current session of the UN General Assembly will jointly develop and concretize this idea.

GORBACHEV'S AWARD CEREMONY SPEECH IN MURMANSK

LD012108 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1458 GMT 1 Oct 87

[Speech by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, at presentation of Order of Lenin and Gold Medal in Murmansk--live]

[Excerpts]

Comrades! Millions of people throughout the world are following with immense interest the process of restructuring in our country. Our bold embarkation on a vast creative work and on revolutionary transformations which require the consolidation of all the forces of the country is powerful proof of our confidence that one can maintain peace and that mankind has a future. Yes, the international situation remains complex, and there remain dangers to which we have no right to close our eyes. But, all the same, there have been certain changes, or changes are beginning.

Of course, if one judges the situation only on the basis of the speeches of certain highly-placed figures in the West, including their policy statements, then it is as if everything is as it was. The same anti-Soviet attacks, the same demands that we prove our adherence to peace by renouncing the way we do things and our principles, the same language of confrontation: Totalitarianism [totalizatsiya], communist expansion, and so on.

However, after the passage of several days, often no one recalls these speeches and in any case points not contained in them figure at the table of business-like political talks and contacts. This is a very interesting feature, interesting phenomenon. This just goes to confirm that we are dealing with the rhetoric of yesterday and that living, real processes have been set in motion. This

means that something really is changing all the same. The fact that it is now already difficult to suggest to people that our foreign policy, the policy of the Soviet Union, or initiatives and our program of a nuclear-free world are allegedly all just propaganda, is one of the elements of the change.

A new and democratic philosophy of international relations and of world policy is paving a way for itself. The new thinking, with its humane criteria and values common to all mankind, is pervading the most varied strata. Its strength lies in the fact that it is in harmony with popular common sense. If one takes into account that great anxiety about the situation in the world is characteristic of world public opinion and of the peoples of the world then our policy is an invitation to dialogue and to a search for a better world and to the normalization of international relations.

This is why, despite all the attempts to denigrate and belittle the significance of our foreign policy initiatives, they are making way because they are in harmony with the sentiments of the broad masses of the working people, and the sentiments in realistic political circles in the West. Favorable tendencies are becoming stronger in

relations between states. A rich and frank [otkrovennyy] East-West dialogue, by no means without results for both sides, has become a characteristic of today's situation in world politics.

Very recently the whole world welcomed the accord reached in the course of negotiations in Washington that the working out of an agreement on medium-range and operational-tactical missiles will be concluded in a very short time. It will be signed at summit level. Thus we are on the eve of a major step in real nuclear disarmament. If it takes place, this will be the first step in the whole period since the war. Until now, either the arms race was in progress or, in any event, this arms race was merely limited to some extent. But there has not yet been a single concrete step taken in disarmament, the elimination of nuclear arms.

The path to this mutual Soviet-U.S. decision was difficult. Reykjavik represented a breakthrough on this path. Life has confirmed the correctness of our evaluation of the meeting in the Icelandic capital. In the face of all manner of panicky rushing around, skeptical statements and a propaganda outcry about a failure—you can remember all that still—events proceeded in the direction paved by Reykjavik. They confirm the correctness of the assessment which was given by us literally 40 minutes after that meeting had ended dramatically, as you recall. [applause]

Reykjavik has truly become a turning point in world history, showing that it is possible to improve the world situation. A different situation had been created, and now, after Reykjavik, nobody could act as though nothing had happened.

For us it was an event which confirmed the correctness of the course chosen by us, the necessity and constructiveness of the new political way of thinking. There is still a long way to go to full utilization of the potential of Reykjavik, but already rays of hope have emerged, not only on medium-range missiles and operational-tactical missiles, but movement has also taken shape concerning a ban on nuclear tests, and large-scale talks on this set of problems will soon begin. It is obvious that our moratorium was not in vain. That, too, was not an easy step for us. It engendered and intensified demands for an end to tests throughout the world.

I am not going to predict the course of events. Not everything depends on us. It is beyond doubt that the first results achieved a few days ago in Washington, and the forthcoming meeting with the U.S. President may bring about a kind of peaceful chain reaction in the sphere of strategic offensive weapons and not putting weapons into space. Also in much more that is now insistently demanding to be included on the agenda of the international dialogue. Thus there are signs of an improvement in the international situation; there are signs.

I repeat, there are also alarming points, fraught with an abrupt aggravation of the situation in the world. On our part it would be irresponsible to underestimate the forces of resistance to change. Those forces are influential, blinded by hatred toward all that is progressive, and very aggressive. They exist in various circles of the Western world, but the greatest concentration is among those who directly, ideologically and politically serve the military and industrial complex, and who, as it were, feed on it.

A recent significant example: On 10 September, in the Joint Economic Committee of the U.S. Congress, a series of hearings started on the subject of Gorbachev's economic reforms. That was what they called the subject. Senators and congressmen took part, with the hearings being both open and closed. Representatives of the administration, analysts and Sovietologists from the CIA, the U.S. Defense Department, and various scientific centers, spoke. In general we consider that to be a normal process, a normal phenomenon. It is good that in the United States people want to examine in detail, at such a level, what is going on in the Soviet Union, what restructuring means, our restructuring, for the rest of the world, including the United States.

Various views are expressed, including ones that are directly contradictory. There is much in them that is sensible and objective. Some of them one could seriously discuss. I would even say that some things it would not be a sin to lend an ear to.

The members of this committee have also heard a view that, apparently, the United States should welcome restructuring for it will lead to a reduction of the threat of a nuclear clash. All this takes place at these hearings and debates. But at these hearings recommendations of a different kind are also given to the Congress by the administration. Here is one of them, almost literally: If the Soviet Union reaches the objectives set by the 27th CPSU Congress this will above all strengthen its prestige in the international arena, will increase the reputation of the CPSU inside the country and abroad and by the same token will increase the threat to U.S. national security. This is the kind of conclusion, it turns out, one can make.

Further, the success of restructuring might weaken the political and economic unity of Western Europe, inasmuch as the USSR will enter its market. The political influence of the USSR in the developing countries will expand as its military and other assistance to them might be increased and some of them might want to adopt the model of the Soviet economy if it turns out to be competitive in relation to the economy of the United States. Another thing: restructuring is dangerous because it will strengthen the USSR's position in international financial and economic organizations. A special threat is seen by these analysts in the increased influence of the Soviet Union in the international arena connected with its initiatives in arms control and also with the prospect of signing a treaty on medium-range missiles.

Here is the conclusion they arrive at: in the end, these fairly sensible compliers who just happen to adhere to this point of view. The conclusion is as follows: the collapse of the socioeconomic policy conducted by the USSR under the leadership of the CPSU and the Soviet government would serve U.S. national interests. The following recommendations are given to help this collapse: press ahead with programs of costly ABM systems within the SDI, and draw the Soviet Union into the arms race to contain its restructuring; allocate even more resources for the creation of costly high precision weapons and space-based military systems for the same purpose; increase the volume of military and other assistance to groups and regimes waging an active struggle against the governments of countries supported by the Soviet Union; oppose the establishment by the USSR of economic and trade ties with other countries and international organizations; fully exclude the possibility of handing over advanced technology to the USSR and other socialist countries; tighten up the control of the activity of Cocom—an organization familiar to you—and the states which constitute it. This is how it is put bluntly and cynically.

We cannot fail to take that position into account either. They are also backed up by certain forces—primarily the military-industrial complex. All the more so since the peace-loving protestations that we often hear from U.S. officials are accompanied in the same breath, as they say, by praise for the position-of-strength policy and by arguments very similar to those used by the authors of the recommendations that I quoted. The militarist and anti-Soviet forces are evidently worried that the interest in the people and political circles of the West at what is now happening in the Soviet Union, and the growth in the understanding of its foreign policy, have not wiped away the artificially created image of an enemy, the image which they have now been unscrupulously exploiting for decades. Well, that's their worry; we will go on firmly along the path of restructuring and new thinking. [applause]

Comrades, since I am speaking in Murmansk, the capital of the Soviet Arctic region, it is not out of place to take a look at the idea of mankind's cooperation from the standpoint also of the situation in the northern part of the world. As we see it, there are several weighty reasons for this. The Arctic is not just the Arctic Ocean; it is also the northern fringe of the three continents of Europe, Asia, and America. The Eurasian, North American and Asian-Pacific regions meet here. The borders meet up and the interests intersect of states that either belong to opposed military blocs or do not form part of them.

The north is also a security problem for the Soviet Union—it is its northern border. In that respect, we have a historical experience that has cost us dear. The people of Murmansk remember well 1918-19 and 1941-45. War this century has also been a stern test for the countries of Northern Europe as a whole, and it seems to us that they

will draw serious conclusions for themselves. Precisely for that reason, the social climate in those countries is evidently more receptive to the new political thinking.

It is significant that the historic Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe was held in one of the northern capitals, Helsinki. It is significant that the next major step in the development of that process—the first agreement in principle on confidence-building measures—was taken in another northern capital, Stockholm.

Reykjavik became a symbol of the hope that nuclear arms are not eternal and that mankind is not doomed to live beneath that sword of Damocles. Major initiatives on matters of international security and disarmament are linked to the names of well-known political figures of Northern Europe: Urho Kekkonen, Olof Palme, whose death at the hands of a wicked killer deeply shook the Soviet people, and Kalevi Sorsa, who has headed the Consultative Council of the Socialist International for many years. We welcome the activity of the authoritative international commission on the environment and development headed by Gro Harlem Brundtland, prime minister of Norway. The fact that Denmark and Norway, although members of NATO, have refused on a unilateral basis to station foreign military bases and nuclear arms on their territory in peacetime, is assessed in a fitting manner in the Soviet Union. This position, in being implemented consistently, is vital for overcoming tension in Europe.

However, this is only a part of the picture. From the North of the earth, the Arctic, as perhaps from no other place, the common nature and the interrelationship of the interests of the whole of our world are tangible; for the Arctic and the Northern Atlantic are not just the incubator of the weather, where the cyclones and anticyclones which influence the climate not only in Europe, the United States, and Canada, but even in Southern Asia and Africa are generated—at the same time one can clearly feel here the chilling breath of the Pentagon's polar strategy: a gigantic potential of nuclear destruction is concentrated on submarines and surface ships, exerting an effect on the political climate in the whole world and able, in its turn, to detonate as a result of a chance military-political failure in any other region of the globe.

The militarization of this part of the world is acquiring a threatening character. Reports that NATO, in the event of an agreement on the elimination of medium-range and operational-tactical missiles, is preparing to work out how to use sea- and air-based cruise missiles from the northern Atlantic, cannot but cause alarm.

That would mean an additional threat, both to us and to all the countries of northern Europe. In Greenland, contrary to the ABM Treaty, a new radar station, an element of the Star Wars program, has been put into operation. U.S. cruise missiles are being tested in northern Canada. Not so long ago the Government of Canada

itself prepared an extensive program for building up military forces in the Arctic. U.S. and NATO military activity is increasing in areas directly adjacent to the Soviet polar regions. The level of NATO military presence in Norway and Denmark is increasing.

Therefore, while I am in Murmansk, on the threshold of the Arctic and the North Atlantic, I would like to invite primarily the states of this region to discuss questions of security which have long since come to a head here. [applause]

What do we have in mind here? It is possible to approach it both by bilateral and multilateral cooperation simultaneously. I have frequently had occasion to speak on the theme of our common European home. The potential of modern civilization permits the Arctic to be made habitable for the good of national economic and other human interests of the states adjacent to the Arctic and of Europe and the whole of the international community.

But to achieve this it is necessary in the first instance to resolve the problems of security which have accumulated here. The USSR favors a radical reduction in the level of military confrontation in the region. May the planet's northern regions, the Arctic, become a zone of peace. May the North Pole become a pole of peace. We propose to all interested states to begin talks on limiting and reducing the scale of military activity in the north as a whole, in both in the eastern and the western hemispheres. [applause]

What do we have in mind specifically? First, a nuclear-free zone in Northern Europe. If that decision was taken, the USSR, as has already been stated, is ready to be a guarantor. It will depend on the participant states as to what the most expedient ways are to set out this guarantee—by multilateral or bilateral agreements, by governmental statements or in some other way. At the same time, the USSR confirms its readiness to discuss with each of the interested states or group of states all problems connected with the creation of a nuclear-free zone, including possible measures applicable to Soviet territory.

We could go quite a long way, in particular, as far as to withdraw from the Soviet Baltic Fleet submarines equipped with ballistic missiles.

As is known, the USSR has already unilaterally dismantled medium-range missile launchers on the Kola Peninsula and most launchers for such missiles on the remaining territory of the Leningrad and Baltic military districts. Quite a lot of operational-tactical missiles have been transferred from these districts. Restrictions have been placed on the holding of military exercises in the regions adjacent to the frontiers with the Scandinavian countries. After the concluding of the agreement on the double global zero, additional opportunities will open up for military detente in that region.

Second, we welcome the initiative of Finnish President Koivisto on restricting naval activity in the seas adjacent to Northern Europe. For its part, the USSR proposes that consultations be started between the Warsaw Pact and NATO on reducing military activity and limiting the scale of the activity of naval and air forces in the waters of the Baltic, Northern, Norwegian, and Greenland Seas and that confidence-building measures be extended to them.

These measures might include an understanding on limiting competition in anti-submarine weapons, informing about major exercises of naval and air forces, and inviting observers from all states participating in the European process to major exercises of these forces. This could be the first step to extending confidence-building measures to the whole of the Arctic and to northern regions in both hemispheres.

In addition, we propose examination of the question of totally banning naval activity in mutually agreed zones of international straits and on intensive shipping routes. It would be possible to hold a meeting of representatives of interested states in Leningrad, for example, for this purpose. The idea arises in connection with the notion of a nuclear-free zone: at present, the northern countries—Iceland, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Finland, in other words—do not have nuclear arms. We are aware of their concern at the fact that we have our test site for carrying out nuclear explosions on Novaya Zemlya. We are thinking about how to solve this problem, which is difficult for us, since too many resources have been invested in it. But, frankly speaking, it would be solved once and for all if the United States agrees to halt nuclear tests, or at least, to begin with, to reduce them to a bare minimum in number and yield.

Third, the Soviet Union attaches great importance to peaceful cooperation in exploiting the resources of the northern Arctic. Exchange of experience and knowledge is extremely important here. It would be possible to work out with joint efforts a general concept for the rational development of the northern regions. We propose, for example, that agreement be reached on working out a unified energy program for the north of Europe. According to the available data, the stocks of such sources of energy as oil and gas are truly immense there. However, extraction of them is attended by extraordinary difficulties, with the need to create unique technical installations capable of withstanding the elements in the Polar region. It would be more sensible to cooperate in this matter, which would help to reduce both material and other expenditure. We have an interest in attracting Canada and Norway, for example, to create mixed firms and enterprises for the exploitation of oil and gas on our northern sea shelf. We are ready for relevant negotiations with other states, as well. We are prepared for joint work on utilizing the resources of the Kola Peninsula and on implementing other major business projects in the most varied forms, including joint enterprises.

Fourth, scientific study of the Arctic is of huge importance for all mankind. We have very rich experiences here. We are prepared to share them. For our part, we are interested in research being conducted by other Arctic and northern states. We already have a program of scientific exchanges with Canada. We propose the holding in 1988 of a conference of Arctic states to coordinate scientific research in the Arctic. It would be possible to examine there the subject of establishing a joint Arctic scientific council. If the partners agree, Murmansk could be the venue for holding the conference. [applause] Issues connected with the interests of the indigenous population of the north and with the study of their ethnic peculiarities and the development of cultural links among the northern ethnic groups demand special attention.

Fifth, we attach particular importance to cooperation among the countries of the north in the matter of protecting the environment. The vital need here is obvious. The experience of joint measures to defend the marine environment in the Baltic, which are currently being implemented by a commission of seven littoral states, would be worth spreading to the whole ocean and sea area of the planet's northern zone. The Soviet Union proposes a joint working out of a united, comprehensive plan for protecting the environment of the north. The north European countries could be an example to others by agreeing to establish a system for monitoring the condition of the environment and radiation safety in the region. We must move quickly to protect the nature of the tundra and the forests of the tundra and of the northern taiga regions.

Sixth, the shortest sea route from Europe to the Far East and the Pacific Ocean passes through the Arctic. I think that, depending on how things proceed in the normalization of international relations, we could open up the northern sea route to foreign shipping, with us ensuring an icebreaker escort. These are our proposals. These are the concrete contents of Soviet foreign policy directed toward the north. These are our intentions and plans for the future. Of course, guaranteeing security and developing cooperation in the north is an international matter: it does not just depend on us. We are prepared to discuss any ideas and proposals coming from others. The main thing is to conduct affairs in such a way that the climate here is fixed by the warm Gulf Stream of the pan-European process, and not by the polar breath of accumulated suspicions and prejudices. [applause]

What everyone can be absolutely sure of is the Soviet Union's deep and undoubted interest in ensuring that the north of the planet, its own polar and subpolar regions, and all the northern countries never again become an arena of war, and that a genuine zone of peace and fruitful cooperation will be created here. [applause]

These, comrades, are our approaches to affairs domestic and international, and to understanding the correlations between the former and the latter. In the former and in

the latter, our policy has demonstrated its vitality and constructive nature. We are convinced that there is no other way to security and social progress apart from creative work for the sake of man's happiness and freedom inside his country, and the development of cooperation based on equal rights between states in the international arena. We have a sense of legitimate pride in our country having stood and still standing at the sources of both socialist practice and new thinking. The world has changed beyond all recognition over the last 70 years, equally in things material, spiritual, and political. The Great October's contribution to mankind's social and ideological progress is one of the greatest gains for civilization, today and tomorrow. It is within our ability and in our interest to increase this contribution through restructuring and its practical results.

Allow me to wish you and your families, as well as all the working people of the region, successes in all work for the transformation of our country, in study and daily life, and to congratulate you one more time on your meeting the 70th anniversary of the Great October as a Hero City. [applause]

SOVIET ACADEMICS DISCUSS 'REASONABLE SUFFICIENCY'

PM130735 Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 40, 12 Oct 87 pp 13-15

[United States and Canada Institute Deputy Director Vitaliy Zhurkin, Institute Section Head Sergey Karaganov, and Institute Senior Researcher Andrey Kortunov article: "Reasonable Sufficiency--Or How To Break the Vicious Circle"--passages in boldface as published]

[Text] Indeed, is it reasonable that there is an accumulation on our planet of more than 50,000 nuclear warheads? Or that nearly 30 million men are under arms in various countries of the world? And this, in peacetime?

The arms race, however, has its own inner logic, one that in the final analysis leads to the most irrational of all possible outcomes--the annihilation of the human race. It is precisely the objective of the reasonable sufficiency concept to break the vicious circle of this logic. Keys to security [subhead]

The basic premise of the concept is that security is primarily a political problem. In our time reasonable security of a country can be ensured only through a strategy representing an integral rational combination of the political, military, economic, ideological, humanitarian and other factors involved. The dominant role in this complex is played by political factors. There alone we can find the rational answer to the challenge presented to the security of the nations. **In the political sphere the key to the solution of the central problem of the security of each state separately and all of them taken together, to the limitation and reduction of armaments can be found.**

By relying exclusively on military technical means a state inevitably sets its own security against international security, its own interests, against the interests of the world community as a whole. And concept of reasonable sufficiency requires of political leaders a readiness to take account of the interests of their adversaries, to make concessions and agree to compromises. Firm observance of one's own interests does not exclude, but rather presupposes, readiness to make concessions. Only in this way can agreement be reached.

It is the enormous dimensions of the existing nuclear arsenals that afford broad possibilities for drastic and far-reaching steps towards scaling them down to the levels of reasonable sufficiency. To rule out the possibility of a nuclear strike made with impunity, to deal the aggressor an unacceptable damage by air retaliatory strike, the side attacked would need to use only a small percentage of its strategic arsenal. Hence both sides could proceed to reduce nuclear (and not only nuclear) armaments in large quantities at once without prejudicing their security.

The concept of reasonable sufficiency presupposes that to prevent aggression it is necessary not only to achieve a balance of forces, to evaluate the hypothetical potential of the other side, but above all to restrain its leaders from unleashing war, to take account of its real intentions, and, what is most important, its interests.

These interests are as a rule constant, they change rather slowly and are determined by stable factors--geographical, class, economic, historical, socio-psychological, and last, but not the least political. A realistic assessment of these factors can be a safeguard against underestimation of the threat, which is fraught with the increasing likelihood of war, and against exaggeration of that threat which could provoke tensions, as arms buildup and eventually undermine international security.

To determine the dimensions of the threat it is not enough to properly appraise the armed forces of the other side; it is also necessary to make a thorough analysis of its specific political, social, moral, psychological, historical and cultural features. Only such an analysis can ascertain the extent of the damage wrought by retaliatory action the threat of which would deter its ruling circles from unleashing aggressive war. What symmetric response lacks [subhead]

The process of adoption in international practice of the concept of reasonable sufficiency will of course be long and difficult. Nevertheless in some areas of the relations between the two blocs it could be applied already today. After all, the principles of the concept are universal. For instance, they presuppose the need for strictly defensive military doctrines on both sides. Moreover, they presuppose bringing the structure of the armed forces, especially along the line of confrontation between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization, the development of the military policies as a whole, and the operational art (even tactics, perhaps, especially in Europe) into full conformity with the officially proclaimed defensive character of the military doctrines. **What is in question is the gradual creation of a political and military climate (primarily in Europe) in which neither side would stand in fear of surprise attack.** This would be facilitated by reducing the share of offensive and increasing the share of defensive weapons in the armed forces, and by changing the character of military exercises so as not to evoke the suspicions of the other side. That is, Mikhail Gorbachev pointed out in his recent article, the armed forces of any given state should be sufficient to repel potential aggressor but insufficient to conduct offensive operations. Needless to say, the best way to improve the general situation has always been and remains the reduction of armed forces and armaments.

An asymmetrical response to the provocative actions of the other side should play an important role in practical implementation of the principle of reasonable sufficiency. At first glance copying the actions of the initiators of arms buildups—the development and deployment of analogous systems—is the simplest and most “natural” means of preventing violations of the strategic balance. Actually, however, copying various armaments developed and deployed by the political aggressor frequently results in lagging behind in the arms race. Moreover, as military technology becomes more sophisticated and more time is needed to develop, test and deploy weapons, the lag could even increase.

Further, a symmetrical response means that the initiator of a new round in the arms race can make more effective use of its technological, geostrategic and other advantages. The other side is compelled to conduct the contest on the “opponent’s field” and according to his “rules of the game.” In that case the cost of the arms race (economic and political) could be greater for that side than for the initiator of the round.

Experience shows that the asymmetrical response not only makes it possible to avoid such negative consequences but creates some extremely complex problems for the country that initiated the arms race. For example, in the 1950s the United States persistently sought to compel the Soviet Union to compete with it in the building of a strategic bomber force, counting on the geostrategic advantages of the U.S. (primarily, the dense

network of bases it had built around the U.S.S.R.) and also on its technological and industrial superiority enabling Washington to dictate its own terms in this competition. The asymmetrical response of the U.S.S.R.—the accelerated development of intercontinental ballistic missiles—was an important response for the U.S., forcing it to revise many of its traditional tenets of military strategy. The development of the ICBMs was the main factor enabling the U.S.S.R. to achieve within a historically brief space of time strategic parity with the U.S. (A more detailed exposition of the evolution of the principles of reasonable sufficiency will be found in an article by the same authors in the December issue of the journal *U.S.A.: Economics, Politics, Ideology* (T-1).

Equally discouraging and unexpected for Washington was the Soviet Union’s resolve to give an asymmetrical reply to Strategic Defence Initiative should the U.S. decide, in spite of everything, to deploy weapons in outer space. The Soviet position as regards countermeasures to neutralize the SDI programme denotes that programme to strategic and economic failure. The advantage of unilateral action [subhead]

An important element of reasonable sufficiency should be the flexible combination of bilateral and unilateral steps towards limiting and reducing armaments. Many believe that here unilateral measures play a purely secondary role, pursuing tactical rather than strategic objectives. Hopes are mainly pinned on bilateral and multilateral measures. As we see it, however, the correlation between bilateral and unilateral measures is more complex.

The bilateral (as well as the multilateral) process of reducing armaments is the principle avenue for ensuring security. Some notable progress has been made along these lines, and the potential in this respect is enormous.

At the same time, it would be a mistake to regard the bilateral process of reducing armaments as the only possible way and to close one’s eyes to the difficulties and problems it involves. In the context of the unavoidable reciprocity of the bilateral process, the side that is interested in the continuation of the arms race and maintaining tension can, by simply blocking progress, cut short or emasculate the process. An agreement requiring thorough assessment of the extremely complex balance of interests not only takes time but in large measure reduces the negotiations to a technical procedure, to endless consultations of experts. As a result, the political substance of the negotiations can be eroded.

Since World War II some substantial measures to limit and reduce armaments have been implemented unilaterally. And although the U.S. and the West in general have also sometimes taken such steps (the demobilization of American forces after the war, U.S. troop reductions after the Vietnam war), the priority in this sphere unquestionably belongs to the U.S.S.R.

In the initial years after the end of World War II the Soviet Union demobilized about 8.5 million men. In 1955-58 the Soviet armed forces were unilaterally reduced by 2,140,000, and in 1960 there was a decision to make further cut of 1.2 million, but its implementation was later suspended.

These unilateral measures despite their scale (by the end of the 1950s the Soviet armed forces had been reduced by more than one third) by no means weakened the international positions of the U.S.S.R. On the contrary, the second half of the 1950s and the early 1960s were marked by a rapid growth of the prestige and influence of the Soviet Union and the gradual improvement of the world situation. Nor did these measures undermine the security of the U.S.S.R. For they were accompanied by a broad peace offensive which made virtually impossible for the West to bring additional military pressure to bear on our country. The unilateral steps taken by the U.S.S.R. in the 1970s were far more modest in scale and significance, although in the 1970s the political and strategic positions of the U.S.S.R. continued to grow stronger on the basis of the strategic parity with the U.S.A. which the Soviet Union had achieved by the beginning of the decade.

In all probability reasonable sufficiency should presuppose the flexible combination of unilateral, bilateral and multilateral measures in the sphere of arms limitation. Also possible are measures of an "intermediate type" combining the advantages of both the unilateral and bilateral or multilateral approach (for instance, parallel unilateral actions agreed between the states at a sufficiently high level, but not put in a form of an official agreement.) A faulty doctrine [subhead]

Although the strategic balance between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A., NATO and the Warsaw Treaty states is the determining factor of the military and political situation, the strategic nuclear forces as such account for a relatively small share of the economic burden of the arms race (for the U.S., for example, it amounts to no more than 15-20 per cent of the defence budget). The bulk of the costs of the military confrontation is accounted for by the combined arms units and conventional armaments, a considerable part of which is intended for the realization of one or another regional objective. The conventional arms buildup presents an even more tangible threat to military-strategic stability. Hence the importance of applying the principle of reasonable sufficiency also at the regional level.

The striving to create forces capable of waging hostilities in regional conflicts in several different theaters of operations concurrently comes into conflict with that principle. A striking example of such strategy is the American concepts of "two-and-a-half" or "three-and-a-half" wars, envisaging readiness to wage two (and perhaps three) major wars at once, for instance in Europe and in the Far East and a small war in the Third World.

The irrationality of this approach stems not only from the fact that a "major war" would inevitably escalate into a nuclear war. The history of the last decades shows that in none of the regional armed conflicts (even those which in American terminology can be labeled as "half wars") has the aggressor succeeded in achieving a military victory not to speak of a political one. Judging by everything conflicts of the scale of the U.S. invasion of Grenada can be regarded as the upper limit of effective use of armed force in modern conditions. Any conflict of major dimensions can drag out for years and even decades, now waning, now flaring up again. While the political and military losses involved outweigh any advantages that might be gained.

Thus, the level of reasonable sufficiency as applied to conventional armed forces must be determined not by the ability to win a major local conflict but by ensuring an adequate defence potential so that the aggressor should not be able to count either on a "local blitzkrieg" or on escalating such a conflict with impunity. Accordingly, the importance of many quantitative factors decreases and the role of such factors as the quality of armaments, mobility and level of professional training, material and preparedness of forces increases.

Another principle of reasonable sufficiency at regional (and for that matter at global) level is to avoid attempts to build up armed strength with the aim of balancing the combined forces of all potential adversaries. This is a totally unrealistic task. Confrontation with all potential opponents cannot but weaken a country. And the surplus of strength accumulated hinders the way to the arms reduction.

Speaking more generally, reasonable sufficiency evidently calls for selective definition of the political objectives as applied to each given region of the world and ensuring that these objectives conform to the economic potential and the main foreign policy principles and tasks of a country on the world arena. How costly violation of this principle can be was plainly demonstrated by the Vietnam war: it showed the inability of U.S. political elite to match their aims with their means, and their ideological rhetoric with the interests and potentialities of the United States.

The principles of reasonable sufficiency at regional level should include also the renunciation by the great powers of attempts to act as military guarantors of Third World regimes that have no broad social base and are incapable of defending themselves. Thus, what is in question are measures to strengthen international security ruling out military involvement in developing countries. Needed—glasnost in the military sphere [subhead]

The transition from today's mutual military and political deterrence to a broad and eventually comprehensive system of international security is a complex and as yet far from fully comprehended process which will take an entire historical epoch. But one thing is clear already.

today, and that is the danger and bankruptcy of the concept of deterrence. It must be replaced by the concepts of international cooperation and mutual security in the military, political, economic and humanitarian spheres. A prominent place here belongs to the principles of reasonable sufficiency. It is these principles that should determine the dimensions and character of the defensive potentials of states both at the successive stages of nuclear disarmament and in the nuclear-free world of the future.

The affirmation in international life of the principles of reasonable sufficiency would be helped greatly by raising the predictability of the behavior of states, and primarily the great powers on the world arena. Predictability is a necessary condition for a reliable stabilization of the world strategic situation, but it is incompatible with the concept of nuclear deterrence. The Western architects and proponents of this concept have always regarded as one of its main virtues the unpredictability and even the irrationality of the behavior of the nuclear powers which supposedly has an intimidating effect on the other side, especially at times of international crises.

The concept of reasonable sufficiency is closely linked also with the problem of information on the mutual base on the military activity of the states. Some headway has been made in this respect (periodic release of information about strategic and other potentials and the Stockholm decisions relating to military exercises). A big contribution to this process was made by the Berlin Statement of the Political Consultative Committee on the military doctrine of the Warsaw Treaty states, their readiness to compare, together with NATO members, the military doctrines of the two alliances and the prospects of their evolution. But this is not enough. **In the present-day world there is a need for openness, for more information about the armed forces of the sides.** For centuries secrecy in this sphere was an important means of safeguarding security. Today, when national means of verification are constantly being perfected, the core of the security system—strategic armaments, and to a considerable extent also conventional armaments—have in large measure ceased to be a secret for the other side. Moreover the absence of reliable information is often used by unscrupulous propaganda agencies for the systematic exaggeration of data and the fabrication of nonexistent "threats." Progress towards reasonable sufficiency should proceed parallel with the solution of this problem of international security.

/8309

CSO: 52001007

SOVIET ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSES SOUTH ATLANTIC PEACE ZONE

Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 5, May 87 pp 140-141

[Report by I.N.: "Zone of Peace and Cooperation in South Atlantic"]

[Text] Late last year a roundtable was held at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO) on the theme "Problems and Prospects for Creating a Zone of Peace and Cooperation in the South Atlantic." In addition to the MGIMO specialists on Latin America, associates of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MID) and the Union of Soviet Friendship Societies (SSOD) took part in it.

The initiative to declare the South Atlantic region a "zone of peace and cooperation" was proposed by the President of Brazil Jose Sarney in a speech in September 1985 at the UN General Assembly. The initiative is encountering ever-broader support of the world community; this is illustrated by the fact that along with Brazil 13 states of Africa and Latin America acted as coauthors of the draft of the resolution adopted by an overwhelming majority of votes at the 41st Session of the UN General Assembly. Questions related to the evolution of the doctrine of "national security" in Brazil, Argentina, and other countries of the region and the naval activity in the South Atlantic and problems of intercontinental and regional cooperation in Latin America and Africa, as well as international factors influencing the realization of the Brazilian initiative were the focus of the debate at MGIMO.

Opening the meeting, its director Doctor of Historical Sciences Professor A.F. Shulgovskiy (MGIMO) directed the participants' attention to the complexity and ambiguity of the processes of democratization occurring in a number of Latin American countries in conditions of the departure of military-authoritarian regimes from the political arena. Taking into account the increased attention which has traditionally been devoted in these states to the doctrine of "national security," it is especially important to determine what new things the changes occurring are bringing to their development. The analysis of the Brazilian foreign policy initiative is interesting, in particular, because it was proposed during the democratization processes and important changes in the socioeconomic structures of the society. In this connection the participants in the discussion face yet another task--identifying the degree to which the latter foreign policy concepts reflect the

process of the formation in Latin America of new centers of antagonism and new "centers of strength."

The speech by P.I. Filonenko (MGIMO) was devoted to a critical analysis of the evolution of foreign policy concepts and doctrines advanced in Brazil in the 19th and 20th centuries as well as the role they assign to the states of South America bordering on Brazil and the African countries. The conclusion of the speaker was reduced to the assertion that in the last decade the process of the formation of a new--South American--center of imperialist influence has been going on. It was also noted that a civilian government's foreign policy should be evaluated when taking into account the features and degree of modernization of the socioeconomic structures which became established in the years of the rule of military regimes.

I.N. Kapyrin (MGIMO) examined the main features of the Brazilian version of the doctrine of "national security" which was reflected in the works of Golberi do Couto-e-Silva and their evolution in connection with the development of new systems of weapons, above all naval weapons, and the place of the southern part of the Atlantic Ocean in this doctrine. He recalled that Brazil in 1962--before the military governments came to power--had already made a proposal to simultaneously declare Latin America and Africa nonnuclear zones.

The report by A.G. Spitsin (SSOD) examined the specific features of the evolution of the doctrine of "national security" in Argentina. It emphasized that the 1982 Malvina crisis was a turning point in the formation of its foreign policy aspect; at that time the country's leadership was forced to seek support from the developing countries against England. In the opinion of the speaker, the country's present leadership is interested on a long-term basis in realizing the Brazilian initiative, since that could help strengthen its position in solving the problem of the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands and create more favorable conditions for economic cooperation among the countries of the South Atlantic.

In the opinion of A. Shchetinin (MID) up to now the degree of realization of Brazil's foreign policy potential is not in keeping with its economic potential. For a long time Brazil kept out of resolving such important political problems of the region as the problem of the foreign debt or the situation in Central America and surrendered the initiative to the two leading states of the continent--Argentina and Mexico, who had joined the "Delhi Six." Taking into account these factors, the Brazilian proposal, in the reporter's opinion, represents a civilian government's attempt to strengthen positions within the country and maintain the process of democratization by following a more active foreign policy line.

*Such problems as the borders of the proposed zone and the make-up of its possible participants, ways to carry out the initiative in practice taking into account the experience of formulating such proposals regarding other regions and the water area of the Pacific Ocean, the nature of the programs of development of the Brazilian naval forces and the production of naval weapons, the recent restoration of official contacts between the Brazilian and American military, and others were discussed during the debate. The participants in

the discussion also studied the prospects for strengthening the positions of Brazilian capital in the economy of the African countries located on the Atlantic coast and possible contradictions which could arise between Brazil and the former colonial powers.

The advancement of the Brazilian initiative bears witness to the continued change in the correlation of forces on the continent and to the developing process of a major country of the region becoming a great power. The initiative has ever-greater influence on consolidating integration processes in Latin America. The objective idea of the initiative, which takes a course to oppose the United States and other developed capitalist powers, signifies a desire to carry on a dialogue with them as equals. The Brazilian proposal carries significant peace-loving content, has a favorable effect on the international situation, and provides a broad field for seeking points of contact of the positions of the most diverse countries in the struggle against the United States' aggressive course in the world arena.

In concluding the discussion, A.F. Shulgovskiy noted that the debate demonstrated how multifaceted and contradictory the problem of creating a "zone of peace and cooperation" in South America is. However, this idea's time has come, since it is the basis for a complicated complex of both objective and subjective reasons. At the present time it would obviously be premature to evaluate the Brazilian initiative on the level of the possibility of its full realization. Or rather, attention should be focused on possible ways to develop it, identifying the positions of various political forces which stand behind particular approaches to this initiative.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo "Nauka", "Latinskaya Amerika", 1987

12424

CSO: 1807/357

ITALY ACCEPTS WEU STANCE ON SECURITY

Continued Alliance With U.S.

52002416 Paris AFP in English 1301 GMT 27 Oct 87

[Text] The Hague, Oct 27 (AFP)—Western European defence must depend on a continued alliance with the United States, ministers of defence and foreign affairs from the seven nations of the Western European Union (WEU) agreed here Tuesday, informed sources said.

Agreeing on a "European security platform", the ministers also stressed the need to maintain the "credibility" of the independent French and British nuclear forces.

"The security of West European Countries can only be ensured in close association with our North American allies," the sources said, quoting an agreed text.

It added that "in the nuclear field we shall continue to carry our share, some of us by pursuing the appropriate cooperative arrangements with the United States, the United Kingdom and France, by continuing to maintain independent nuclear forces, the credibility of which they are determined to preserve."

The 14 ministers — two each from Belgium, Britain, France, West Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands agreed earlier to call for modernisation of France and Britain's nuclear deterrent forces.

Italy, which showed initial reluctance, reportedly fell in line with the rest of its WEU partners.

An Italian spokesman said on Monday that Italian Foreign Minister Giulio Andreotti had said that before drawing up a common defence position, West European countries should have a common foreign policy defined within the EEC.

The ministers were also expected to discuss the problems in the Gulf, to which five of the seven countries

have sent minesweepers, intermediate range nuclear missiles, the preparation of a summit between U.S. President Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, and an expansion of the WEU.

The WEU, set up in 1948, is the only purely European forum for discussing defence, as the EEC is not able to dictate to its members on such matters.

The WEU has assumed new importance since the United States and the Soviet Union moved towards signing an agreement on eliminating medium-range nuclear arms in Europe, a move which many of the European powers see as threatening their security.

Andreotti, Zanone Speak to Press

*AU280834 Rome ANSA in English 0817 GMT
28 Oct 87*

[Text] (ANSA) The Hague — Foreign Minister Giulio Andreotti and Defense Minister Valerio Zanone of Italy said they were satisfied with the Atlantic and European cornerstone displayed in the "Platform of European Interests on Issues of Security" endorsed here by the seven Western European Union Nations.

In a press conference held at the end of work Tuesday, the Italian ministers spoke in positive terms of the two days of meetings of the foreign ministers and defense ministers from Great Britain, West Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg focused on arms control and disarmament, East-West relations and the Gulf crisis.

"The document we approved satisfies the fundamental requirements for removing all reasons for polemics", said Andreotti. He also affirmed that the text "fits in the framework of the Atlantic treaty which, in forty years of testing and evolution, has shown that it is an invaluable instrument, the political and military reality of which is to be maintained."

Within NATO, he said, there is "the interdependence of European political integration and the problems of joint defense and security."

After disclosing that there were differences of opinions on the rough draft of the document, the Italian minister said that the best parts of the draft were carried into the final document.

Discussing the section in which the importance of the British and French nuclear forces are acknowledged and the need to maintain their credibility, Andreotti said that these forces "are factors in relation to the East though they are not earmarked for the protection of the entire NATO lineup."

The Italian defense minister told the press conference that the platform was the product of considerable diplomatic effort and work on the language and is satisfactory

because "it strongly underscores the concepts of European integration which requires integrated defenses in the framework of the Atlantic alliance.

"Dissuasion is a global concept which requires close ties of alliance between Europe and the United States," Zanone noted.

Speaking of the ways, means and stages leading to an integrated European defense system, the minister said that "Italy is watching with interest" the Franco-German initiative with an eye on the prospect of staging joint

maneuvers "among all the seven WEU member nations."

The defense chief laid heavy emphasis on the need to standardize weapons and push for cooperation in technological research on armaments systems.

In this connection, Zanone announced the scheduling of a conference to be sponsored by the WEU on the more efficient management of the European government's defense resources.

A diplomatic source here said the meeting may be held in The Hague in mid-March next year.

Andreotti View Supported

AU271055 Rome ANSA in English 1045 GMT 27 Oct 87

[Text] (ANSA) The Hague, October 27—There appears to be substantial support among the seven Western European Union nations for the conditions posed by Italian Foreign Minister Giulio Andreotti regarding setting down a "platform" for European defence.

Speaking before WEU foreign and defence ministers yesterday Andreotti underlined the need for defence cooperation to be tied to a "political design". "It is not a question of slowing down or delaying anything" Andreotti affirmed, "what is necessary is having clear ideas in the political sense".

While diplomatic sources here believe the "platform" will be approved, there remains some question on how it will be received "politically", in particular this aspect of boosting the role of the WEU—composed of Great Britain, West Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. During the meetings held today and yesterday, Italy was represented by Andreotti and Defence Minister Valerio Zanone.

"What we must know" Andreotti told the WEU partners, "is what direction we want to go. We can work in seven, but only if there is an overall design for a European union".

Andreotti paid special attention to the relations between the WEU and the NATO alliance, affirming that "nothing should be created that in any way would have repercussions on the Atlantic alliance".

The Italian foreign minister then went on to cite French President Francois Mitterrand who had maintained that "one needs to know the ends" of boosting defence cooperation, adding that "a joint political power base is necessary which is capable of perfecting what we have already done for on [as received] a military level".

Observers here pointed out that Italy views the WEU council meeting here as a "testing ground" for the WEU

given that its expansion should coincide with the movement towards a united Europe. For the Italians, the WEU should be given greater power and backing for military questions given that the European community, by the nature of its original charter, focuses only on political and economic aspects of East-West relations.

The meeting here yesterday of WEU foreign and defence ministers began with a general examination of East-West relations, following the disappointing visit to Moscow of U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz, while the situation in the Persian Gulf is expected to be looked at today.

Diplomatic sources here have not ruled out the possibility that there may also be a side meeting of those WEU nations that are also members of the United Nations Security Council. Italy, that chairs the Security Council for the month of October, West Germany, Great Britain, and France. The latter two nations are permanent members on the Security Council and thus have veto power.

The WEU "platform", presented by Dutch Foreign Minister Hans van Broek, given that the Netherlands hold the duty presidency of the WEU Council, is similar to the defence "charter" presented by French Premier Jacques Chirac and is said to contain "priorities and orientations" on European defence and security especially in light of the tentative US-Soviet accord on eliminating short and medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe.

During initial debate on the "platform", both Andreotti and British Foreign Secretary Sir Geoffrey Howe insisted on the need of linking the Euromissile accord with a "package" that would include chemical weapons and conventional forces, in an effort to reduce them to the lowest level possible.

On the sidelines of the WEU council meeting, Zanone had a working luncheon with his Dutch counterpart Willem van Eckelen. Sources close to Zanone said that the defence minister was, overall, satisfied by the "platform" presented, in particular for its "European and Atlantic (NATO)" stance.

END OF

FICHE

DATE FILMED

1 February 1988
